The Electron framework lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. In affected versions of Electron IPC messages sent from the main process to a subframe in the renderer process, through webContents.sendToFrame, event.reply or when using the remote module, can in some cases be delivered to the wrong frame. If your app uses remote, calls webContents.sendToFrame, or calls event.reply in an IPC message handler then it is impacted by this issue. This has been fixed in versions 9.4.0, 10.2.0, 11.1.0, and 12.0.0-beta.9. There are no workarounds for this issue.

zonote through 0.4.0 allows XSS via a crafted note, with resultant Remote Code Execution (because nodeIntegration in webPreferences is true).

Electron before versions 11.0.0-beta.6, 10.1.2, 9.3.1 or 8.5.2 is vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Apps using both `contextIsolation` and `sandbox: true` are affected. Apps using both `contextIsolation` and `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames: true` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

In Electron before versions 11.0.0-beta.1, 10.0.1, 9.3.0 or 8.5.1 the `will-navigate` event that apps use to prevent navigations to unexpected destinations as per our security recommendations can be bypassed when a sub-frame performs a top-frame navigation across sites. The issue is patched in versions 11.0.0-beta.1, 10.0.1, 9.3.0 or 8.5.1 As a workaround sandbox all your iframes using the sandbox attribute. This will prevent them creating top-frame navigations and is good practice anyway.

In Electron before versions 7.2.4, 8.2.4, and 9.0.0-beta21, arbitrary local file read is possible by defining unsafe window options on a child window opened via window.open. As a workaround, ensure you are calling `event.preventDefault()` on all new-window events where the `url` or `options` is not something you expect. This is fixed in versions 9.0.0-beta.21, 8.2.4 and 7.2.4.

In Electron before versions 7.2.4, 8.2.4, and 9.0.0-beta21, there is a context isolation bypass. Code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. Apps using contextIsolation are affected. This is fixed in versions 9.0.0-beta.21, 8.2.4 and 7.2.4.

In Electron before versions 7.2.4, 8.2.4, and 9.0.0-beta21, there is a context isolation bypass. Code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. Apps using both `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is fixed in versions 9.0.0-beta.21, 8.2.4 and 7.2.4.

In Electron before versions 6.1.1, 7.2.4, 8.2.4, and 9.0.0-beta21, there is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. Apps using "contextIsolation" are affected. There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected. This is fixed in versions 6.1.1, 7.2.4, 8.2.4, and 9.0.0-beta21.

GitHub Electron 1.7.15, 1.8.7, 2.0.7, and 3.0.0-beta.6, in certain scenarios involving IFRAME elements and "nativeWindowOpen: true" or "sandbox: true" options, is affected by a WebPreferences vulnerability that can be leveraged to perform remote code execution.

Based on details posted by the ElectronJS team; A remote code execution vulnerability has been discovered in Google Chromium that affects all recent versions of Electron. Any Electron app that accesses remote content is vulnerable to this exploit, regardless of whether the [sandbox option](https://electron.atom.io/docs/api/sandbox-option) is enabled.