In Eclipse Jetty HTTP/2 server implementation, when encountering an invalid HTTP/2 request, the error handling has a bug that can wind up not properly cleaning up the active connections and associated resources. This can lead to a Denial of Service scenario where there are no enough resources left to process good requests.

In Eclipse Jetty versions 9.4.0 thru 9.4.46, and 10.0.0 thru 10.0.9, and 11.0.0 thru 11.0.9 versions, the parsing of the authority segment of an http scheme URI, the Jetty HttpURI class improperly detects an invalid input as a hostname. This can lead to failures in a Proxy scenario.

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Prior to versions 6.2.7 and 7.0.0, an attacker attempting to load a specially crafted Lua script can cause NULL pointer dereference which will result with a crash of the redis-server process. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 7.0.0 and 6.2.7. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable, if Lua scripting is not being used, is to block access to `SCRIPT LOAD` and `EVAL` commands using ACL rules.

Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. By exploiting weaknesses in the Lua script execution environment, an attacker with access to Redis prior to version 7.0.0 or 6.2.7 can inject Lua code that will execute with the (potentially higher) privileges of another Redis user. The Lua script execution environment in Redis provides some measures that prevent a script from creating side effects that persist and can affect the execution of the same, or different script, at a later time. Several weaknesses of these measures have been publicly known for a long time, but they had no security impact as the Redis security model did not endorse the concept of users or privileges. With the introduction of ACLs in Redis 6.0, these weaknesses can be exploited by a less privileged users to inject Lua code that will execute at a later time, when a privileged user executes a Lua script. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 7.0.0 and 6.2.7. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem…

There's a flaw in urllib's AbstractBasicAuthHandler class. An attacker who controls a malicious HTTP server that an HTTP client (such as web browser) connects to, could trigger a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDOS) during an authentication request with a specially crafted payload that is sent by the server to the client. The greatest threat that this flaw poses is to application availability.

A flaw was found in python. An improperly handled HTTP response in the HTTP client code of python may allow a remote attacker, who controls the HTTP server, to make the client script enter an infinite loop, consuming CPU time. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability.

In Spring Framework versions 5.3.0 - 5.3.10, 5.2.0 - 5.2.17, and older unsupported versions, it is possible for a user to provide malicious input to cause the insertion of additional log entries.

A null pointer de-reference was found in the way samba kerberos server handled missing sname in TGS-REQ (Ticket Granting Server - Request). An authenticated user could use this flaw to crash the samba server.

Hiredis is a minimalistic C client library for the Redis database. In affected versions Hiredis is vulnurable to integer overflow if provided maliciously crafted or corrupted `RESP` `mult-bulk` protocol data. When parsing `multi-bulk` (array-like) replies, hiredis fails to check if `count * sizeof(redisReply*)` can be represented in `SIZE_MAX`. If it can not, and the `calloc()` call doesn't itself make this check, it would result in a short allocation and subsequent buffer overflow. Users of hiredis who are unable to update may set the [maxelements](https://github.com/redis/hiredis#reader-max-array-elements) context option to a value small enough that no overflow is possible.

Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. When parsing an incoming Redis Standard Protocol (RESP) request, Redis allocates memory according to user-specified values which determine the number of elements (in the multi-bulk header) and size of each element (in the bulk header). An attacker delivering specially crafted requests over multiple connections can cause the server to allocate significant amount of memory. Because the same parsing mechanism is used to handle authentication requests, this vulnerability can also be exploited by unauthenticated users. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 6.2.6, 6.0.16 and 5.0.14. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable is to block access to prevent unauthenticated users from connecting to Redis. This can be done in different ways: Using network access control tools like firewalls, iptables, security groups, etc. or Enabling TLS and requiring users to authenticate usi…