PyInstaller bundles a Python application and all its dependencies into a single package. A PyInstaller built application, elevated as a privileged process, may be tricked by an unprivileged attacker into deleting files the unprivileged user does not otherwise have access to. A user is affected if **all** the following are satisfied: 1. The user runs an application containing either `matplotlib` or `win32com`. 2. The application is ran as administrator (or at least a user with higher privileges than the attacker). 3. The user's temporary directory is not locked to that specific user (most likely due to `TMP`/`TEMP` environment variables pointing to an unprotected, arbitrary, non default location). Either: A. The attacker is able to very carefully time the replacement of a temporary file with a symlink. This switch must occur exactly between `shutil.rmtree()`'s builtin symlink check and the deletion itself B: The application was built with Python 3.7.x or earlier which has no protection…

In PyInstaller before version 3.6, only on Windows, a local privilege escalation vulnerability is present in this particular case: If a software using PyInstaller in "onefile" mode is launched by a privileged user (at least more than the current one) which have his "TempPath" resolving to a world writable directory. This is the case for example if the software is launched as a service or as a scheduled task using a system account (TempPath will be C:\Windows\Temp). In order to be exploitable the software has to be (re)started after the attacker launch the exploit program, so for a service launched at startup, a service restart is needed (e.g. after a crash or an upgrade).