An issue was discovered in Luna Simo PPR1.180610.011/202001031830. A pre-installed app with a package name of com.skyroam.silverhelper writes three IMEI values to system properties at system startup. The system property values can be obtained via getprop by all third-party applications co-located on the device, even those with no permissions granted, exposing the IMEI values to processes without enforcing any access control.

An issue was discovered in Luna Simo PPR1.180610.011/202001031830. It sends the following Personally Identifiable Information (PII) in plaintext using HTTP to servers located in China: user's list of installed apps and device International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). This PII is transmitted to log.skyroam.com.cn using HTTP, independent of whether the user uses the Simo software.

An issue was discovered in Luna Simo PPR1.180610.011/202001031830. It mishandles software updates such that local third-party apps can provide a spoofed software update file that contains an arbitrary shell script and arbitrary ARM binary, where both will be executed as the root user with an SELinux domain named osi. To exploit this vulnerability, a local third-party app needs to have write access to external storage to write the spoofed update at the expected path. The vulnerable system binary (i.e., /system/bin/osi_bin) does not perform any authentication of the update file beyond ensuring that it is encrypted with an AES key (that is hard-coded in the vulnerable system binary). Processes executing with the osi SELinux domain can programmatically perform the following actions: install apps, grant runtime permissions to apps (including permissions with protection levels of dangerous and development), access extensive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) using the programmaticall…

Android devices with code from Ragentek contain a privileged binary that performs over-the-air (OTA) update checks. Additionally, there are multiple techniques used to hide the execution of this binary. This behavior could be described as a rootkit. This binary, which resides as /system/bin/debugs, runs with root privileges and does not communicate over an encrypted channel. The binary has been shown to communicate with three hosts via HTTP: oyag[.]lhzbdvm[.]com oyag[.]prugskh[.]net oyag[.]prugskh[.]com Server responses to requests sent by the debugs binary include functionalities to execute arbitrary commands as root, install applications, or update configurations. Examples of a request sent by the client binary: POST /pagt/agent?data={"name":"c_regist","details":{...}} HTTP/1. 1 Host: 114.80.68.223 Connection: Close An example response from the server could be: HTTP/1.1 200 OK {"code": "01", "name": "push_commands", "details": {"server_id": "1" , "title": "Test Command", "comments":…