The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.

A vulnerability in the Cisco Discovery Protocol implementation for the Cisco IP Phone could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to remotely execute code with root privileges or cause a reload of an affected IP phone. The vulnerability is due to missing checks when processing Cisco Discovery Protocol messages. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted Cisco Discovery Protocol packet to the targeted IP phone. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to remotely execute code with root privileges or cause a reload of an affected IP phone, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. Cisco Discovery Protocol is a Layer 2 protocol. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be in the same broadcast domain as the affected device (Layer 2 adjacent).

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series Phones could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access certain parts of the web interface that would normally require authentication.

A vulnerability in the information storage architecture of several Cisco IP Phone models could allow an unauthenticated, physical attacker to obtain confidential information from an affected device. This vulnerability is due to unencrypted storage of confidential information on an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by physically extracting and accessing one of the flash memory chips. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain confidential information from the device, which could be used for subsequent attacks.

A vulnerability in the debug shell of Cisco IP Phone software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to read any file on the device file system. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing crafted input to a debug shell command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to read any file on the device file system.

The TrustZone implementation in certain Broadcom MediaxChange firmware could allow an unauthenticated, physically proximate attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution in the TrustZone Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) of an affected device. This, for example, affects certain Cisco IP Phone and Wireless IP Phone products before 2021-07-07. Exploitation is possible only when the attacker can disassemble the device in order to control the voltage/current for chip pins.

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The Wi-Fi implementation does not verify the Message Integrity Check (authenticity) of fragmented TKIP frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject and possibly decrypt packets in WPA or WPA2 networks that support the TKIP data-confidentiality protocol.

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.