Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Stefano Marra Smart Mockups allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Smart Mockups: from n/a through 1.2.0.

The Mock software contains a vulnerability wherein an attacker could potentially exploit privilege escalation, enabling the execution of arbitrary code with root user privileges. This weakness stems from the absence of proper sandboxing during the expansion and execution of Jinja2 templates, which may be included in certain configuration parameters. While the Mock documentation advises treating users added to the mock group as privileged, certain build systems invoking mock on behalf of users might inadvertently permit less privileged users to define configuration tags. These tags could then be passed as parameters to mock during execution, potentially leading to the utilization of Jinja2 templates for remote privilege escalation and the execution of arbitrary code as the root user on the build server.

WireMock with GUI versions 3.2.0.0 through 3.0.4.0 are vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting (SXSS) through the recording feature. An attacker can host a malicious payload and perform a test mapping pointing to the attacker's file, and the result will render on the Matched page in the Body area, resulting in the execution of the payload. This occurs because the response body is not validated or sanitized.

All versions of the package mockjs are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the Util.extend function due to missing check if the attribute resolves to the object prototype. By adding or modifying attributes of an object prototype, it is possible to create attributes that exist on every object, or replace critical attributes with malicious ones. This can be problematic if the software depends on existence or non-existence of certain attributes, or uses pre-defined attributes of object prototype (such as hasOwnProperty, toString or valueOf). User controlled inputs inside the extend() method of the Mock.Handler, Mock.Random, Mock.RE.Handler or Mock.Util, will allow an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. Workaround By using a denylist of dangerous attributes, this weakness can be eliminated. Add the following line in the Util.extend function: js js if (["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"].includes(name)) continue js // src/mock/handler.js Util.extend = function extend() …

WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses. These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. This issue has been addressed in version 2.35.1 of wiremock-jre8 and wiremock-jre8-standalone, version 3.0.3 of wiremock and wiremock-standalone, version 2.6.1 of…

WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. WireMock can be configured to only permit proxying (and therefore recording) to certain addresses. This is achieved via a list of allowed address rules and a list of denied address rules, where the allowed list is evaluated first. Until WireMock Webhooks Extension 3.0.0-beta-15, the filtering of target addresses from the proxy mode DID NOT work for Webhooks, so the users were potentially vulnerable regardless of the `limitProxyTargets` settings. Via the WireMock webhooks configuration, POST requests from a webhook might be forwarded to an arbitrary service reachable from WireMock’s instance. For example, If someone is running the WireMock docker Container inside a private cluster, they can trigger internal POST requests against unsecured APIs or even against secure ones by passing a token, discovered using another exploit, via authentication headers. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.35.1 and 3.0.3 of wiremock. Wiremock studio …

Prototype pollution vulnerability in function enable in mockery.js in mfncooper mockery commit 822f0566fd6d72af8c943ae5ca2aa92e516aa2cf via the key variable in mockery.js.

easy-mock v1.5.0-v1.6.0 allows remote attackers to bypass the vm2 sandbox and execute arbitrary system commands through special js code.

MockServer is open source software which enables easy mocking of any system you integrate with via HTTP or HTTPS. An attacker that can trick a victim into visiting a malicious site while running MockServer locally, will be able to run arbitrary code on the MockServer machine. With an overly broad default CORS configuration MockServer allows any site to send cross-site requests. Additionally, MockServer allows you to create dynamic expectations using Javascript or Velocity templates. Both engines may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on-behalf of MockServer. By combining these two issues (Overly broad CORS configuration + Script injection), an attacker could serve a malicious page so that if a developer running MockServer visits it, they will get compromised. For more details including a PoC see the referenced GHSL-2021-059.

SAP Commerce Cloud (Accelerator Payment Mock), versions - 1808, 1811, 1905, 2005, allows an unauthenticated attacker to submit a crafted request over a network to a particular SAP Commerce module URL which will be processed without further interaction, the crafted request leads to Server Side Request Forgery attack which could lead to retrieval of limited pieces of information about the service with no impact on integrity or availability.