mintplex-labs/anything-llm is vulnerable to path traversal attacks due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input in the logo filename functionality. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the logo filename to reference files outside of the restricted directory. This can lead to unauthorized reading or deletion of files by utilizing the `/api/system/upload-logo` and `/api/system/logo` endpoints. The issue stems from the lack of filtering or validation on the logo filename, allowing attackers to target sensitive files such as the application's database.

As a default user on a multi-user instance of AnythingLLM, you could execute a call to the `/export-data` endpoint of the system and then unzip and read that export that would enable you do exfiltrate data of the system at that save state. This would require the attacked to be granted explicit access to the system, but they can do this at any role. Additionally, post-download, the data is deleted so no evidence would exist that the exfiltration occured.

If an attacked was given access to an instance with the admin or manager role there is no backend authentication that would prevent the attacked from creating a new user with an `admin` role and then be able to use this new account to have elevated privileges on the instance

A user who is privileged already `manager` or `admin` can set their profile picture via the frontend API using a relative filepath to then user the PFP GET API to download any valid files. The attacker would have to have been granted privileged permissions to the system before executing this attack.

Any user can delete an arbitrary folder (recursively) on a remote server due to bad input sanitization leading to path traversal. The attacker would need access to the server at some privilege level since this endpoint is protected and requires authorization.

Enable exports of the database and associated exported information of the system via the default user role. The attacked would have to have been granted access to the system prior to the attack. It is worth noting that the deterministic nature of the export name is lower risk as the UI for exporting would start the download at the same time, which once downloaded - deletes the export from the system. The endpoint for exporting should simply be patched to a higher privilege level.

Should an instance of AnythingLLM be hosted on an internal network and the attacked be explicitly granted a permission level of manager or admin, they could link-scrape internally resolving IPs of other services that are on the same network as AnythingLLM. This would require the attacker also be able to guess these internal IPs as `/*` ranging is not possible, but could be brute forced. There is a duty of care that other services on the same network would not be fully open and accessible via a simple CuRL with zero authentication as it is not possible to set headers or access via the link collector.

A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm, allowing users with 'default' role to delete documents uploaded by 'admin'. Despite the intended restriction that prevents 'default' role users from deleting admin-uploaded documents, an attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted DELETE request to the /api/system/remove-document endpoint. This vulnerability is due to improper access control checks, enabling unauthorized document deletion and potentially leading to loss of data integrity.

The inclusion of the web scraper for AnythingLLM means that any user with the proper authorization level (manager, admin, and when in single user) could put in the URL ``` http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance ``` which is a special IP and URL that resolves only when the request comes from within an EC2 instance. This would allow the user to see the connection/secret credentials for their specific instance and be able to manage it regardless of who deployed it. The user would have to have pre-existing knowledge of the hosting infra which the target instance is deployed on, but if sent - would resolve if on EC2 and the proper `iptable` or firewall rule is not configured for their setup.

Attacker, with permission to submit a link or submits a link via POST to be collected that is using the file:// protocol can then introspect host files and other relatively stored files.