Improper input validation in firmware for some Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless Wi-Fi in multiple operating systems and some Killer(TM) Wi-Fi in Windows 10 and 11 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access.

Improper input validation in firmware for Intel(R) PROSet/Wireless Wi-Fi in multiple operating systems and Killer(TM) Wi-Fi in Windows 10 and 11 may allow an unauthenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.