An improper authorization vulnerability exists in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm application, specifically within the '/api/v/' endpoint and its sub-routes. This flaw allows unauthenticated users to perform destructive actions on the VectorDB, including resetting the database and deleting specific namespaces, without requiring any authorization or permissions. The issue affects all versions up to and including the latest version, with a fix introduced in version 1.0.0. Exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to complete data loss of document embeddings across all workspaces, rendering workspace chats and embeddable chat widgets non-functional. Additionally, attackers can list all namespaces, potentially exposing private workspace names.

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the latest version of mintplex-labs/anything-llm, allowing attackers to bypass the official fix intended to restrict access to intranet IP addresses and protocols. Despite efforts to filter out intranet IP addresses starting with 192, 172, 10, and 127 through regular expressions and limit access protocols to HTTP and HTTPS, attackers can still bypass these restrictions using alternative representations of IP addresses and accessing other ports running on localhost. This vulnerability enables attackers to access any asset on the internal network, attack web services on the internal network, scan hosts on the internal network, and potentially access AWS metadata endpoints. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied URLs, which can be exploited to perform SSRF attacks.

As a default user on a multi-user instance of AnythingLLM, you could execute a call to the `/export-data` endpoint of the system and then unzip and read that export that would enable you do exfiltrate data of the system at that save state. This would require the attacked to be granted explicit access to the system, but they can do this at any role. Additionally, post-download, the data is deleted so no evidence would exist that the exfiltration occured.

If an attacked was given access to an instance with the admin or manager role there is no backend authentication that would prevent the attacked from creating a new user with an `admin` role and then be able to use this new account to have elevated privileges on the instance

A user who is privileged already `manager` or `admin` can set their profile picture via the frontend API using a relative filepath to then user the PFP GET API to download any valid files. The attacker would have to have been granted privileged permissions to the system before executing this attack.

AnythingLLM is an application that turns any document, resource, or piece of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In versions prior to commit `08d33cfd8` an unauthenticated API route (file export) can allow attacker to crash the server resulting in a denial of service attack. The “data-export” endpoint is used to export files using the filename parameter as user input. The endpoint takes the user input, filters it to avoid directory traversal attacks, fetches the file from the server, and afterwards deletes it. An attacker can trick the input filter mechanism to point to the current directory, and while attempting to delete it the server will crash as there is no error-handling wrapper around it. Moreover, the endpoint is public and does not require any form of authentication, resulting in an unauthenticated Denial of Service issue, which crashes the instance using a single HTTP packet. This issue has been addressed in commit `08d33cfd8`. Users are …

Improper Access Control in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.1.0.

Improper Input Validation in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.1.0.

Relative Path Traversal in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.0.1.