Last Login: August 03, 2020
ccondon-r7's Contributions (18)
The exposed target population may be comparatively low to, say, the whole of the internet, but Rapid7 Labs has noted—rightly so—that a couple thousand exposed gateways is still a pretty concerning state of affairs when those gateways are protecting industrial control systems. Pre-authenticated RCE in VPN products guarding ICS/OT networks during a pandemic is, as the kids say, bad news bears—and that’s not to make light, because this ain’t light. The good news is that there are patches out for all these vulns, even though the downtime required to patch and verify effectively might be nothing to sneeze at. Longer analysis and recommendations by smart people here.
Researchers from around Rapid7’s world (and likely others, too!) have said today that there is likely lower-hanging fruit that will be surfaced in the coming days, particularly around nerve-wracking findings such as exposed Telnet administration ports. There’s a lot of well-justified attention on this grouping of vulns, and with that attention comes increased focus on attack opportunities in general…and the stuff we see clogging up our security noise machines won’t be the only stuff well-resourced attackers are paying attention to. Patch as soon as possible (and yep, easier said than done).
I’m going to quote @hrbrmstr here: Since the registry config workaround doesn’t require a system restart, it seems like this is going to be a niche exploitation issue for organizations that haven’t config’d or patched their way to safety.
Still haven’t seen PoC past the DoS from maxpl0it (which is a very good Twitter username, unrelatedly) that surfaced quickly after the vuln details were published. Anecdotally, a few other researchers have mused that this probably isn’t the ripest or most valuable target for exploitation (famous last words, eh?).
This is an incredibly attractive and simple attack target: It’s an easily exploitable vulnerability in a highly-exposed HTTP interface (frequently user- and internet-facing) where successful exploitation allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to create user accounts with the highest possible privileges and generally declare themselves the feudal lords of critical SAP estates.
It’s difficult to imagine that widespread exploitation would take much time at all. SAP included a mitigation in the patch release details, but with so many mitigation bypasses coming out for other recent critical vulns, it’s definitely advisable to take CISA’s guidance to heart—i.e., patch over mitigation wherever possible and as quickly as possible.
Active exploitation targeting recently published Citrix ADC vulns as of July 9, according to SANS ISC: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Exploit+Attempts+Targeting+Recent+Citrix+ADC+Vulnerabilities+CTX276688/26330/
Vuln affects versions 5.0.0 to 5.5.4 and is weaponized in the form of a Metasploit module: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/13512
Credit to Charles Fol for discovery and Zenofex for fast analysis and slick weaponization.
I keep thinking that it’s unlikely enterprises use vBulletin and this must be more of a risk to small- and medium-sized businesses, but looking at some of the companies that are said to be vBulletin customers, I suppose that’s not necessarily true. Article on in-the-wild exploitation here.
There’s a Metasploit exploit module out for this now, and pen testers have reported that seeing vulnerable Exchange servers is common on engagements. As zeroSteiner has pointed out on Twitter, all that’s needed for reliable code execution is a domain user with a mailbox: https://twitter.com/zeroSteiner/status/1234983584177328129.
TrustedSec has a great write-up on IoCs here: https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/