CUPS is a standards-based, open-source printing system, and `cups-browsed` contains network printing functionality including, but not limited to, auto-discovering print services and shared printers. `cups-browsed` binds to `INADDR_ANY:631`, causing it to trust any packet from any source, and can cause the `Get-Printer-Attributes` IPP request to an attacker controlled URL. Due to the service binding to `*:631 ( INADDR_ANY )`, multiple bugs in `cups-browsed` can be exploited in sequence to introduce a malicious printer to the system. This chain of exploits ultimately enables an attacker to execute arbitrary commands remotely on the target machine without authentication when a print job is started. This poses a significant security risk over the network. Notably, this vulnerability is particularly concerning as it can be exploited from the public internet, potentially exposing a vast number of systems to remote attacks if their CUPS services are enabled.

CUPS is a standards-based, open-source printing system, and cups-filters provides backends, filters, and other software for CUPS 2.x to use on non-Mac OS systems. Any value passed to `FoomaticRIPCommandLine` via a PPD file will be executed as a user controlled command. When combined with other logic bugs as described in CVE_2024-47176, this can lead to remote command execution.