Zulip is an open source team chat application. A weekly cron job (added in 50256f48314250978f521ef439cafa704e056539) demotes channels to being "inactive" after they have not received traffic for 180 days. However, upon doing so, an event was sent to all users in the organization, not just users in the channel. This event contained the name of the private channel. Similarly, the same commit (50256f48314250978f521ef439cafa704e056539) added functionality to notify clients when channels stopped being "inactive." The first message sent to a private channel which had not previously had any messages for over 180 days (and were thus already marked "inactive") would leak an event to all users in the organization; this event also contained the name of the private channel. Commits 75be449d456d29fef27e9d1828bafa30174284b4 and a2a1a7f8d152296c8966f1380872c0ac69e5c87e fixed the issue. This vulnerability only existed in `main`, and was not part of any published versions.

Zulip server provides an open-source team chat that helps teams stay productive and focused. Zulip Server 7.0 and above are vulnerable to an information disclose attack, where, if a Zulip server is hosting multiple organizations, an unauthenticated user can make a request and determine if an email address is in use by a user. Zulip Server 9.4 resolves the issue, as does the `main` branch of Zulip Server. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Zulip is an open-source team collaboration. When a user moves a Zulip message, they have the option to move all messages in the topic, move only subsequent messages as well, or move just a single message. If the user chose to just move one message, and was moving it from a public stream to a private stream, Zulip would successfully move the message, -- but active users who did not have access to the private stream, but whose client had already received the message, would continue to see the message in the public stream until they reloaded their client. Additionally, Zulip did not remove view permissions on the message from recently-active users, allowing the message to show up in the "All messages" view or in search results, but not in "Inbox" or "Recent conversations" views. While the bug has been present since moving messages between streams was first introduced in version 3.0, this option became much more common starting in Zulip 8.0, when the default option in the picker for mov…

Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool. A vulnerability in version 8.0 is similar to CVE-2023-32677, but applies to multi-use invitations, not single-use invitation links as in the prior CVE. Specifically, it applies when the installation has configured non-admins to be able to invite users and create multi-use invitations, and has also configured only admins to be able to invite users to streams. As in CVE-2023-32677, this does not let users invite new users to arbitrary streams, only to streams that the inviter can already see. Version 8.1 fixes this issue. As a workaround, administrators can limit sending of invitations down to users who also have the permission to add users to streams.

Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool. It was discovered by the Zulip development team that active users who had previously been subscribed to a stream incorrectly continued being able to use the Zulip API to access metadata for that stream. As a result, users who had been removed from a stream, but still had an account in the organization, could still view metadata for that stream (including the stream name, description, settings, and an email address used to send emails into the stream via the incoming email integration). This potentially allowed users to see changes to a stream’s metadata after they had lost access to the stream. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 7.5 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool with topic-based threading that combines email and chat. Users who used to be subscribed to a private stream and have been removed from it since retain the ability to edit messages/topics, move messages to other streams, and delete messages that they used to have access to, if other relevant organization permissions allow these actions. For example, a user may be able to edit or delete their old messages they posted in such a private stream. An administrator will be able to delete old messages (that they had access to) from the private stream. This issue was fixed in Zulip Server version 7.3.

Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool with unique topic-based threading that combines the best of email and chat to make remote work productive and delightful. The main development branch of Zulip Server from May 2, 2023 and later, including beta versions 7.0-beta1 and 7.0-beta2, is vulnerable to a cross-site scripting vulnerability in tooltips on the message feed. An attacker who can send messages could maliciously craft a topic for the message, such that a victim who hovers the tooltip for that topic in their message feed triggers execution of JavaScript code controlled by the attacker.

Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool with unique topic-based threading. In the event that 1: `ZulipLDAPAuthBackend` and an external authentication backend (any aside of `ZulipLDAPAuthBackend` and `EmailAuthBackend`) are the only ones enabled in `AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS` in `/etc/zulip/settings.py` and 2: The organization permissions don't require invitations to join. An attacker can create a new account in the organization with an arbitrary email address in their control that's not in the organization's LDAP directory. The impact is limited to installations which have this specific combination of authentication backends as described above in addition to having `Invitations are required for joining this organization` organization permission disabled. This issue has been addressed in version 6.2. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may enable the `Invitations are required for joining this organization` organization permission to prevent this issue.

Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool with unique topic-based threading. Zulip administrators can configure Zulip to limit who can add users to streams, and separately to limit who can invite users to the organization. In Zulip Server 6.1 and below, the UI which allows a user to invite a new user also allows them to set the streams that the new user is invited to -- even if the inviting user would not have permissions to add an existing user to streams. While such a configuration is likely rare in practice, the behavior does violate security-related controls. This does not let a user invite new users to streams they cannot see, or would not be able to add users to if they had that general permission. This issue has been addressed in version 6.2. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may limit sending of invitations down to users who also have the permission to add users to streams.

Zulip is an open-source team collaboration tool. In versions of zulip prior to commit `2f6c5a8` but after commit `04cf68b` users could upload files with arbitrary `Content-Type` which would be served from the Zulip hostname with `Content-Disposition: inline` and no `Content-Security-Policy` header, allowing them to trick other users into executing arbitrary Javascript in the context of the Zulip application. Among other things, this enables session theft. Only deployments which use the S3 storage (not the local-disk storage) are affected, and only deployments which deployed commit 04cf68b45ebb5c03247a0d6453e35ffc175d55da, which has only been in `main`, not any numbered release. Users affected should upgrade from main again to deploy this fix. Switching from S3 storage to the local-disk storage would nominally mitigate this, but is likely more involved than upgrading to the latest `main` which addresses the issue.