Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability in Apache Airflow Celery provider, Apache Airflow. Sensitive information logged as clear text when rediss, amqp, rpc protocols are used as Celery result backend Note: the vulnerability is about the information exposed in the logs not about accessing the logs. This issue affects Apache Airflow Celery provider: from 3.3.0 through 3.4.0; Apache Airflow: from 1.10.0 through 2.6.3. Users are recommended to upgrade Airflow Celery provider to version 3.4.1 and Apache Airlfow to version 2.7.0 which fixes the issue.

The olmax99/helm-flask-celery repository before 2022-05-25 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.

This affects the package celery before 5.2.2. It by default trusts the messages and metadata stored in backends (result stores). When reading task metadata from the backend, the data is deserialized. Given that an attacker can gain access to, or somehow manipulate the metadata within a celery backend, they could trigger a stored command injection vulnerability and potentially gain further access to the system.

django-celery-results through 1.2.1 stores task results in the database. Among the data it stores are the variables passed into the tasks. The variables may contain sensitive cleartext information that does not belong unencrypted in the database.

Celery 2.1 and 2.2 before 2.2.8, 2.3 before 2.3.4, and 2.4 before 2.4.4 changes the effective id but not the real id during processing of the --uid and --gid arguments to celerybeat, celeryd_detach, celeryd-multi, and celeryev, which allows local users to gain privileges via vectors involving crafted code that is executed by the worker process.