An attacker can abuse the batch-requests plugin to send requests to bypass the IP restriction of Admin API. A default configuration of Apache APISIX (with default API key) is vulnerable to remote code execution. When the admin key was changed or the port of Admin API was changed to a port different from the data panel, the impact is lower. But there is still a risk to bypass the IP restriction of Apache APISIX's data panel. There is a check in the batch-requests plugin which overrides the client IP with its real remote IP. But due to a bug in the code, this check can be bypassed.

The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023.

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request Smuggling') vulnerability in Apache APISIX when using `forward-auth` plugin.This issue affects Apache APISIX: from 3.8.0, 3.9.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.8.1, 3.9.1 or higher, which fixes the issue.

In APache APISIX before 3.13.1, the jwt-auth plugin has a security issue that leaks the user's secret key because the error message returned from the dependency lua-resty-jwt contains sensitive information.

In Apache APISIX before 2.13.0, when decoding JSON with duplicate keys, lua-cjson will choose the last occurred value as the result. By passing a JSON with a duplicate key, the attacker can bypass the body_schema validation in the request-validation plugin. For example, `{"string_payload":"bad","string_payload":"good"}` can be used to hide the "bad" input. Systems satisfy three conditions below are affected by this attack: 1. use body_schema validation in the request-validation plugin 2. upstream application uses a special JSON library that chooses the first occurred value, like jsoniter or gojay 3. upstream application does not validate the input anymore. The fix in APISIX is to re-encode the validated JSON input back into the request body at the side of APISIX. Improper Input Validation vulnerability in __COMPONENT__ of Apache APISIX allows an attacker to __IMPACT__. This issue affects Apache APISIX Apache APISIX version 2.12.1 and prior versions.

In Apache APISIX Dashboard before 2.10.1, the Manager API uses two frameworks and introduces framework `droplet` on the basis of framework `gin`, all APIs and authentication middleware are developed based on framework `droplet`, but some API directly use the interface of framework `gin` thus bypassing the authentication.

The uri-block plugin in Apache APISIX before 2.10.2 uses $request_uri without verification. The $request_uri is the full original request URI without normalization. This makes it possible to construct a URI to bypass the block list on some occasions. For instance, when the block list contains "^/internal/", a URI like `//internal/` can be used to bypass it. Some other plugins also have the same issue. And it may affect the developer's custom plugin.

In Apache APISIX Dashboard version 2.6, we changed the default value of listen host to 0.0.0.0 in order to facilitate users to configure external network access. In the IP allowed list restriction, a risky function was used for the IP acquisition, which made it possible to bypass the network limit. At the same time, the default account and password are fixed.Ultimately these factors lead to the issue of security risks. This issue is fixed in APISIX Dashboard 2.6.1

In Apache APISIX, the user enabled the Admin API and deleted the Admin API access IP restriction rules. Eventually, the default token is allowed to access APISIX management data. This affects versions 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5.