The function CheckMic() in the Realtek RTL8195A Wi-Fi Module prior to versions released in April 2020 (up to and excluding 2.08) does not validate the size parameter for an internal function, _rt_md5_hmac_veneer() or _rt_hmac_sha1_veneer(), resulting in a stack buffer over-read which can be exploited for denial of service. An attacker can impersonate an Access Point and attack a vulnerable Wi-Fi client, by injecting a crafted packet into the WPA2 handshake. The attacker does not need to know the network's PSK.

A vulnerability in the WPA2 and WPA3 security implementation of Cisco IOS XE Wireless Controller Software for the Cisco Catalyst 9000 Family could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to cause denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to incorrect packet processing during the WPA2 and WPA3 authentication handshake when configured for dot1x or pre-shared key (PSK) authentication key management (AKM) with 802.11r BSS Fast Transition (FT) enabled. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted authentication packet to an affected device. A successful exploit could cause an affected device to reload, resulting in a DoS condition.

An issue was discovered on Realtek RTL8195AM, RTL8711AM, RTL8711AF, and RTL8710AF devices before 2.0.6. A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the client code that takes care of WPA2's 4-way-handshake via a malformed EAPOL-Key packet with a long keydata buffer.

Ecobee Ecobee4 4.2.0.171 devices can be forced to deauthenticate and connect to an unencrypted Wi-Fi network with the same SSID, even if the device settings specify use of encryption such as WPA2, as long as the competing network has a stronger signal. An attacker must be able to set up a nearby SSID, similar to an "Evil Twin" attack.

The Voo branded NETGEAR CG3700b custom firmware V2.02.03 uses the same default 8 character passphrase for the administrative console and the WPA2 pre-shared key. Either an attack against HTTP Basic Authentication or an attack against WPA2 could be used to determine this passphrase.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that support 802.11v allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Station-To-Station-Link (STSL) Transient Key (STK) during the PeerKey handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11r allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the fast BSS transmission (FT) handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.