JH407 (2)

Last Login: April 17, 2024
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Thanks for the reply.

Vendor documentation on this page here: https://knowledgebase.paloaltonetworks.com/KCSArticleDetail?id=kA10g000000PLXiCAO
identifies that /ssl-vpn/hipreportcheck.esp is valid. at least validates the legitimacy of the POC.

Vendor also specififed that client HIP may be blocked if URL filtering is applied “to outside to outside allow rule.” indicating it might be another mitigation for the POC exploit.

Also included log entries for if URL blocking is enabled. If URL blocking is applied as specified above might be able to use these logs to determine if attempted exploitation has occurred.

(T1884) 10/04/19 10:04:39:708 Debug(1253): SSL3 alert write:warning:close notify
(T1884) 10/04/19 10:04:39:709 Info (4309): SendNReceive() failed.
(T1884) 10/04/19 10:04:39:709 Debug(4136): Send hip report check failed <<<<

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Technical Analysis

An OS command injection vulnerability exists within Palo Alto Global Protect effecting the following versions with an overall rating of 10/10:

PAN-OS 11.1 < 11.1.2-h3
PAN-OS 11.0 < 11.0.4-h1
PAN-OS 10.2 < 10.2.7-h8, < 10.2.8-h3, < 10.2.9-h1

Current information known is that this vulnerability also requires that GlobalProtect gateway and device telemetry are configured. Mitigating exploitation of this vulnerability can be done by disabling telemetry according to the vendor.

An brief OSINT investigation reveals that POC exploit code of this vulnerability does exist in the wild but during my search I only found one reference and no other articles covering the root cause of this vulnerability. Poc can be found here: https://github.com/h4x0r-dz/CVE-2024-3400?tab=readme-ov-file credit to w2xim3 for finding this

Please feel free to correct any inaccurate information. in this post. thank you.