Attacker Value
Unknown
(0 users assessed)
Exploitability
Unknown
(0 users assessed)
User Interaction
None
Privileges Required
Low
Attack Vector
Local
0

CVE-2024-47742

Disclosure Date: October 21, 2024
Add MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques that apply to this CVE.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

firmware_loader: Block path traversal

Most firmware names are hardcoded strings, or are constructed from fairly
constrained format strings where the dynamic parts are just some hex
numbers or such.

However, there are a couple codepaths in the kernel where firmware file
names contain string components that are passed through from a device or
semi-privileged userspace; the ones I could find (not counting interfaces
that require root privileges) are:

  • lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() seems to construct the firmware
    filename from “ModelName”, a string that was previously parsed out of
    some descriptor (“Vital Product Data”) in lpfc_fill_vpd()
  • nfp_net_fw_find() seems to construct a firmware filename from a model
    name coming from nfp_hwinfolookup(pf->hwinfo, “nffw.partno”), which I
    think parses some descriptor that was read from the device.
    (But this case likely isn’t exploitable because the format string looks
    like “netronome/nic
    %s”, and there shouldn’t be any folders starting
    with “netronome/nic_”. The previous case was different because there,
    the “%s” is at the start of the format string.)
  • module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the
    ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as
    GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is
    enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided
    firmware name.
    (But I think to reach this case, you need to have CAP_NET_ADMIN over a
    network namespace that a special kind of ethernet device is mapped into,
    so I think this is not a viable attack path in practice.)

Fix it by rejecting any firmware names containing “..” path components.

For what it’s worth, I went looking and haven’t found any USB device
drivers that use the firmware loader dangerously.

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CVSS V3 Severity and Metrics
Base Score:
7.8 High
Impact Score:
5.9
Exploitability Score:
1.8
Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Attack Vector (AV):
Local
Attack Complexity (AC):
Low
Privileges Required (PR):
Low
User Interaction (UI):
None
Scope (S):
Unchanged
Confidentiality (C):
High
Integrity (I):
High
Availability (A):
High

General Information

Vendors

  • linux

Products

  • linux kernel
Technical Analysis