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CVE-2024-26670

Disclosure Date: April 02, 2024
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Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD

Currently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn’t
quite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit
memory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR.

The ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to
handle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295,
which are described in:

In both cases the workaround is described as:

| If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the
| kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected
| cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses:
|
| 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including
| unused contexts or addresses, such as a TLBI VALE1 Xzr.
|
| 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI.

The important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed “after all
explicit memory accesses”.

Unfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by
an LDR, as we have:

| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
| tlbi vale1, xzr
| dsb nsh
| alternative_else_nop_endif
| alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
| ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR]
| add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp
| eret
| alternative_else_nop_endif
|
| [ … KPTI exception return path … ]

This patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB
immediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses.

The ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives
cannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for
ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch
to skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being:

| alternative_insn “b .L_skip_trampexit\@”, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
| [ … KPTI exception return path … ]
| .L_skip_trampexit\@:
|
| ldr lr, [sp, #S_LR]
| add sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE // restore sp
|
| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
| tlbi vale1, xzr
| dsb nsh
| alternative_else_nop_endif
| eret

The new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is
not in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the
erratum:

| Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the
| issue from occurring.

… and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround
is only necessary “If pagetable isolation is disabled”.

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General Information

Vendors

  • Linux

Products

  • Linux

Additional Info

Technical Analysis