Moderate
CVE-2021-38648
CVE ID
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CVE-2021-38648
MITRE ATT&CK
Collection
Command and Control
Credential Access
Defense Evasion
Discovery
Execution
Exfiltration
Impact
Initial Access
Lateral Movement
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Topic Tags
Description
Open Management Infrastructure Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
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Ratings
-
Attacker ValueMedium
-
ExploitabilityVery High
Technical Analysis
A locally exploitable vulnerability exists within Microsoft’s OMI management server in versions prior to 1.6.8-1 that can allow a local attacker to execute operating system commands as root
. Exploitation consists of sending crafted binary messages to the local UNIX socket on which the service listens. Under normal circumstances, clients (typically omicli
) will send an authentication frame via this interface however the authentication frame can be omitted. In this case, the default values which are initialized to 0 are used and happen to correspond to the UID and GID of the root user and group.
The service must be running in order for this vulnerability to be exploited. The socket file is located at /var/opt/omi/run/omiserver.sock
and can be connected to by anyone using a socket of the AF_UNIX
family.
The strace
utility can be used to view the standard exchange of authentication information:
root@3ad6908bf1bc:/opt/omi/bin# strace -v -f -xx -e trace=socket,connect,write,writev,close /opt/omi/bin/omicli iv root/scx { SCX_OperatingSystem } ExecuteShellCommand { command 'id' timeout 0 } ... [pid 1271] socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0) = 6 [pid 1271] connect(6, {sa_family=AF_UNIX, sun_path="\x2f\x76\x61\x72\x2f\x6f\x70\x74\x2f\x6f\x6d\x69\x2f\x72\x75\x6e\x2f\x6f\x6d\x69\x73\x65\x72\x76\x65\x72\x2e\x73\x6f\x63\x6b"}, 110) = 0 [pid 1271] writev(6, [{iov_base="\x2f\x7e\xa8\xb1\x08\x06\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x08\xd5\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"..., iov_len=48}, {iov_base="\xd8\xd5\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\xd0\xd8\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\xd0\xd4\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"..., iov_len=248}], 2) = 296 [pid 1271] write(5, "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", 8) = 8 [pid 1271] close(7) = 0 [pid 1272] writev(6, [{iov_base="\x2f\x7e\xa8\xb1\x08\x06\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x00\x00\x88\x33\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"..., iov_len=112}, {iov_base="\x57\x99\x2b\x46\x01\x00\x00\x00\x0f\x00\x00\x00\x5f\x4f\x4d\x49\x5f\x4f\x70\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x53\x65\x74\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"..., iov_len=188}, {iov_base="\x60\xea\x6a\xb2\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xa0\x0b\x61\x57\x46\x7f\x00\x00\xe8\x34\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00"..., iov_len=80}, {iov_base="\x60\xea\x6a\xb2\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xa0\x0b\x61\x57\x46\x7f\x00\x00\xe8\x34\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00"..., iov_len=1360}, {iov_base="\x57\x99\x2b\x46\x02\x00\x00\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x53\x43\x58\x5f\x4f\x70\x65\x72\x61\x74\x69\x6e\x67\x53\x79\x73\x74\x65\x6d\x00"..., iov_len=108}, {iov_base="\xd0\x86\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x70\x8a\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x80\x8a\x83\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"..., iov_len=1008}], 6) = 2856 [pid 1272] write(1, "\x69\x6e\x73\x74\x61\x6e\x63\x65\x20\x6f\x66\x20\x45\x78\x65\x63\x75\x74\x65\x53\x68\x65\x6c\x6c\x43\x6f\x6d\x6d\x61\x6e\x64\x0a", 32instance of ExecuteShellCommand ) = 32 [pid 1272] write(1, "\x7b\x0a", 2{ ) = 2 [pid 1272] write(1, "\x20\x20\x20\x20\x52\x65\x74\x75\x72\x6e\x56\x61\x6c\x75\x65\x3d\x74\x72\x75\x65\x0a", 21 ReturnValue=true ) = 21 [pid 1272] write(1, "\x20\x20\x20\x20\x52\x65\x74\x75\x72\x6e\x43\x6f\x64\x65\x3d\x30\x0a", 17 ReturnCode=0 ) = 17 [pid 1272] write(1, "\x20\x20\x20\x20\x53\x74\x64\x4f\x75\x74\x3d\x75\x69\x64\x3d\x30\x28\x72\x6f\x6f\x74\x29\x20\x67\x69\x64\x3d\x30\x28\x72\x6f\x6f"..., 50 StdOut=uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) ) = 50 [pid 1272] write(1, "\x0a", 1 ) = 1 [pid 1272] write(1, "\x20\x20\x20\x20\x53\x74\x64\x45\x72\x72\x3d\x0a", 12 StdErr= ) = 12 [pid 1272] write(1, "\x7d\x0a", 2} ) = 2 [pid 1271] write(5, "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", 8) = 8 [pid 1272] close(6) = 0 ... +++ exited with 0 +++
By following the writev
calls, the standard exchange can be viewed. The frames starting with \x2f\x7e\xa8\xb1
are header frames. All of the data sent as part of the first request can be omitted, leaving the second which contains the command to execute within the binary structure. The results of the operating system command can be read from the socket, though they must be extracted from the binary response. The commands are executed within the context of a subshell.
This vulnerability can be exploited in the default configuration and was patched in version 1.6.8-1 which was released on September 8th 2021.
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General Information
Vendors
- microsoft
Products
- azure automation state configuration -,
- azure automation update management -,
- azure diagnostics (lad) -,
- azure open management infrastructure -,
- azure security center -,
- azure sentinel -,
- azure stack hub -,
- container monitoring solution -,
- log analytics agent -,
- system center operations manager -
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CVE ID
AttackerKB requires a CVE ID in order to pull vulnerability data and references from the CVE list and the National Vulnerability Database. If available, please supply below: