Multiple functions use archives without properly validating the filenames therein, rendering the application vulnerable to path traversal via 'zip slip' attacks. An administrator able to provide tampered archives to be processed by the affected versions of Arc may be able to have arbitrary files extracted to arbitrary filesystem locations. Leveraging this issue, an attacker may be able to overwrite arbitrary files on the target filesystem and cause critical impacts on the system (e.g., arbitrary command execution on the victim’s machine).

On Windows systems, the Arc configuration files resulted to be world-readable. This can lead to information disclosure by local attackers, via exfiltration of sensitive data from configuration files.

On Unix systems (Linux, MacOS), Arc uses a temporary file with unsafe privileges. By tampering with such file, a malicious local user in the system may be able to trigger arbitrary code execution with root privileges.

When configuring Arc (e.g. during the first setup), a local web interface is provided to ease the configuration process. Such web interface lacks authentication and may thus be abused by a local attacker or malware running on the machine itself. A malicious local user or process, during a window of opportunity when the local web interface is active, may be able to extract sensitive information or change Arc's configuration. This could also lead to arbitrary code execution if a malicious update package is installed.

A Denial of Service (Dos) vulnerability in Nozomi Networks Guardian, caused by improper input validation in certain fields used in the Radius parsing functionality of our IDS, allows an unauthenticated attacker sending specially crafted malformed network packets to cause the IDS module to stop updating nodes, links, and assets. Network traffic may not be analyzed until the IDS module is restarted.

Audit records for OpenAPI requests may include sensitive information. This could lead to unauthorized accesses and privilege escalation.