Universal Robots controller execute URCaps (zip files containing Java-powered applications) without any permission restrictions and a wide API that presents many primitives that can compromise the overall robot operations as demonstrated in our video. In our PoC we demonstrate how a malicious actor could 'cook' a custom URCap that when deployed by the user (intendedly or unintendedly) compromises the system

The mintToken function of a smart contract implementation for FuturXe, an Ethereum token, has an integer overflow that allows the owner of the contract to set the balance of an arbitrary user to any value.

The transferFrom function of a smart contract implementation for FuturXE (FXE), an Ethereum ERC20 token, allows attackers to accomplish an unauthorized transfer of digital assets because of a logic error. The developer messed up with the boolean judgment - if the input value is smaller than or equal to allowed value, the transfer session would stop execution by returning false. This makes no sense, because the transferFrom() function should require the transferring value to not exceed the allowed value in the first place. Suppose this function asks for the allowed value to be smaller than the input. Then, the attacker could easily ignore the allowance: after this condition, the `allowed[from][msg.sender] -= value;` would cause an underflow because the allowed part is smaller than the value. The attacker could transfer any amount of FuturXe tokens of any accounts to an appointed account (the `_to` address) because the allowed value is initialized to 0, and the attacker could bypass thi…