When copying files with rsync, octorpki uses the "-a" flag 0, which forces rsync to copy binaries with the suid bit set as root. Since the provided service definition defaults to root ( https://github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki/blob/master/package/octorpki.service ) this could allow for a vector, when combined with another vulnerability that causes octorpki to process a malicious TAL file, for a local privilege escalation.

Attackers can create long chains of CAs that would lead to OctoRPKI exceeding its max iterations parameter. In consequence it would cause the program to crash, preventing it from finishing the validation and leading to a denial of service. Credits to Donika Mirdita and Haya Shulman - Fraunhofer SIT, ATHENE, who discovered and reported this vulnerability.

OctoRPKI tries to load the entire contents of a repository in memory, and in the case of a GZIP bomb, unzip it in memory, making it possible to create a repository that makes OctoRPKI run out of memory (and thus crash).

If the ROA that a repository returns contains too many bits for the IP address then OctoRPKI will crash.

OctoRPKI crashes when encountering a repository that returns an invalid ROA (just an encoded NUL (\0) character).

OctoRPKI does not limit the length of a connection, allowing for a slowloris DOS attack to take place which makes OctoRPKI wait forever. Specifically, the repository that OctoRPKI sends HTTP requests to will keep the connection open for a day before a response is returned, but does keep drip feeding new bytes to keep the connection alive.

OctoRPKI does not limit the depth of a certificate chain, allowing for a CA to create children in an ad-hoc fashion, thereby making tree traversal never end.

OctoRPKI does not escape a URI with a filename containing "..", this allows a repository to create a file, (ex. rsync://example.org/repo/../../etc/cron.daily/evil.roa), which would then be written to disk outside the base cache folder. This could allow for remote code execution on the host machine OctoRPKI is running on.

Any CA issuer in the RPKI can trick OctoRPKI prior to 1.3.0 into emitting an invalid VRP "MaxLength" value, causing RTR sessions to terminate. An attacker can use this to disable RPKI Origin Validation in a victim network (for example AS 13335 - Cloudflare) prior to launching a BGP hijack which during normal operations would be rejected as "RPKI invalid". Additionally, in certain deployments RTR session flapping in and of itself also could cause BGP routing churn, causing availability issues.