In Medtronic MinMed 508 and Medtronic Minimed Paradigm Insulin Pumps, Versions, MiniMed 508 pump – All versions, MiniMed Paradigm 511 pump – All versions, MiniMed Paradigm 512/712 pumps – All versions, MiniMed Paradigm 712E pump–All versions, MiniMed Paradigm 515/715 pumps–All versions, MiniMed Paradigm 522/722 pumps – All versions,MiniMed Paradigm 522K/722K pumps – All versions, MiniMed Paradigm 523/723 pumps – Software versions 2.4A or lower, MiniMed Paradigm 523K/723K pumps – Software, versions 2.4A or lower, MiniMed Paradigm Veo 554/754 pumps – Software versions 2.6A or lower, MiniMed Paradigm Veo 554CM and 754CM models only – Software versions 2.7A or lower, the affected insulin pumps are designed to communicate using a wireless RF with other devices, such as blood glucose meters, glucose sensor transmitters, and CareLink USB devices. This wireless RF communication protocol does not properly implement authentication or authorization. An attacker with adjacent access to one of the…

Medtronic MMT 508 MiniMed insulin pump, 522 / MMT - 722 Paradigm REAL-TIME, 523 / MMT - 723 Paradigm Revel, 523K / MMT - 723K Paradigm Revel, and 551 / MMT - 751 MiniMed 530G The models identified above, when paired with a remote controller and having the "easy bolus" and "remote bolus" options enabled (non-default), are vulnerable to a capture-replay attack. An attacker can capture the wireless transmissions between the remote controller and the pump and replay them to cause an insulin (bolus) delivery.

Medtronic MMT 508 MiniMed insulin pump, 522 / MMT - 722 Paradigm REAL-TIME, 523 / MMT - 723 Paradigm Revel, 523K / MMT - 723K Paradigm Revel, and 551 / MMT - 751 MiniMed 530G communications between the pump and wireless accessories are transmitted in cleartext. A sufficiently skilled attacker could capture these transmissions and extract sensitive information, such as device serial numbers.