IP-in-IP protocol specifies IP Encapsulation within IP standard (RFC 2003, STD 1) that decapsulate and route IP-in-IP traffic is vulnerable to spoofing, access-control bypass and other unexpected behavior due to the lack of validation to verify network packets before decapsulation and routing.

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SMAdata2+ communication protocol does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to man in the middle, packet injection, and replay attacks. Any setting change, authentication packet, scouting packet, etc. can be replayed, injected, or used for a man in the middle session. All functionalities available in Sunny Explorer can effectively be done from anywhere within the network as long as an attacker gets the packet setup correctly. This includes the authentication process for all (including hidden) access levels and the changing of settings in accordance with the gained access rights. Furthermore, because the SMAdata2+ communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. NOTE: the vendor's position is that authentication with encryption is not required on an isolated subnetwork. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower…

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. An attacker can use Sunny Explorer or the SMAdata2+ network protocol to update the device firmware without ever having to authenticate. If an attacker is able to create a custom firmware version that is accepted by the inverter, the inverter is compromised completely. This allows the attacker to do nearly anything: for example, giving access to the local OS, creating a botnet, using the inverters as a stepping stone into companies, etc. NOTE: the vendor reports that this attack has always been blocked by "a final integrity and compatibility check." Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The SIP implementation does not properly use authentication with encryption: it is vulnerable to replay attacks, packet injection attacks, and man in the middle attacks. An attacker is able to successfully use SIP to communicate with the device from anywhere within the LAN. An attacker may use this to crash the device, stop it from communicating with the SMA servers, exploit known SIP vulnerabilities, or find sensitive information from the SIP communications. Furthermore, because the SIP communication channel is unencrypted, an attacker capable of understanding the protocol can eavesdrop on communications. For example, passwords can be extracted. NOTE: the vendor's position is that authentication with encryption is not required on an isolated subnetwork. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. By sending crafted packets to an inverter and observing the response, active and inactive user accounts can be determined. This aids in further attacks (such as a brute force attack) as one now knows exactly which users exist and which do not. NOTE: the vendor's position is that this "is not a security gap per se." Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. By sniffing for specific packets on the localhost, plaintext passwords can be obtained as they are typed into Sunny Explorer by the user. These passwords can then be used to compromise the overall device. NOTE: the vendor reports that exploitation likelihood is low because these packets are usually sent only once during installation. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected

An Incorrect Password Management issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. Default passwords exist that are rarely changed. User passwords will almost always be default. Installer passwords are expected to be default or similar across installations installed by the same company (but are sometimes changed). Hidden user accounts have (at least in some cases, though more research is required to test this for all hidden user accounts) a fixed password for all devices; it can never be changed by a user. Other vulnerabilities exist that allow an attacker to get the passwords of these hidden user accounts. NOTE: the vendor reports that it has no influence on the allocation of passwords, and that global hardcoded master passwords do not exist. Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. The inverters make use of a weak hashing algorithm to encrypt the password for REGISTER requests. This hashing algorithm can be cracked relatively easily. An attacker will likely be able to crack the password using offline crackers. This cracked password can then be used to register at the SMA servers. NOTE: the vendor's position is that "we consider the probability of the success of such manipulation to be extremely low." Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. All inverters have a very weak password policy for the user and installer password. No complexity requirements or length requirements are set. Also, strong passwords are impossible due to a maximum of 12 characters and a limited set of characters. NOTE: the vendor reports that the 12-character limit provides "a very high security standard." Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected

An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. An attacker can change the plant time even when not authenticated in any way. This changes the system time, possibly affecting lockout policies and random-number generators based on timestamps, and makes timestamps for data analysis unreliable. NOTE: the vendor reports that this is largely irrelevant because it only affects log-entry timestamps, and because the plant time would later be reset via NTP. (It has never been the case that a lockout policy or random-number generator was affected.) Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected