In the COVIDSafe application through 1.0.21 for Android, unsafe use of the Bluetooth transport option in the GATT connection allows attackers to trick the application into establishing a connection over Bluetooth BR/EDR transport, which reveals the public Bluetooth address of the victim's phone without authorisation, bypassing the Bluetooth address randomisation protection in the user's phone.

COVIDSafe through v1.0.17 allows a remote attacker to access phone name and model information because a BLE device can have four roles and COVIDSafe uses all of them. This allows for re-identification of a device, and potentially identification of the owner's name.

Unnecessary fields in the OpenTrace/BlueTrace protocol in COVIDSafe through v1.0.17 allow a remote attacker to identify a device model by observing cleartext payload data. This allows re-identification of devices, especially less common phone models or those in low-density situations.

Caching of GATT characteristic values (TempID) in COVIDSafe v1.0.15 and v1.0.16 allows a remote attacker to long-term re-identify an Android device running COVIDSafe.

Non-reinitialisation of random data in the advertising payload in COVIDSafe v1.0.15 and v1.0.16 allows a remote attacker to re-identify Android devices running COVIDSafe by scanning for their advertising beacons.

OpenTrace, as used in COVIDSafe through v1.0.17, TraceTogether, ABTraceTogether, and other applications on iOS and Android, allows remote attackers to conduct long-term re-identification attacks and possibly have unspecified other impact, because of how Bluetooth is used.

The COVIDSafe (Australia) app 1.0 and 1.1 for iOS allows a remote attacker to crash the app, and consequently interfere with COVID-19 contact tracing, via a Bluetooth advertisement containing manufacturer data that is too short. This occurs because of an erroneous OpenTrace manuData.subdata call. The ABTraceTogether (Alberta), ProteGO (Poland), and TraceTogether (Singapore) apps were also affected.