The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.

A vulnerability in the networking component of Cisco access point (AP) software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a temporary disruption of service. This vulnerability is due to overuse of AP resources. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to an AP on an affected device as a wireless client and sending a high rate of traffic over an extended period of time. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the Datagram TLS (DTLS) session to tear down and reset, causing a denial of service (DoS) condition.

A vulnerability in Cisco access point (AP) software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of certain parameters within 802.11 frames. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a wireless 802.11 association request frame with crafted parameters to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause an unexpected reload of an affected device, resulting in a DoS condition.

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.