Should an instance of AnythingLLM be hosted on an internal network and the attacked be explicitly granted a permission level of manager or admin, they could link-scrape internally resolving IPs of other services that are on the same network as AnythingLLM. This would require the attacker also be able to guess these internal IPs as `/*` ranging is not possible, but could be brute forced. There is a duty of care that other services on the same network would not be fully open and accessible via a simple CuRL with zero authentication as it is not possible to set headers or access via the link collector.

A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm, allowing users with 'default' role to delete documents uploaded by 'admin'. Despite the intended restriction that prevents 'default' role users from deleting admin-uploaded documents, an attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted DELETE request to the /api/system/remove-document endpoint. This vulnerability is due to improper access control checks, enabling unauthorized document deletion and potentially leading to loss of data integrity.

The inclusion of the web scraper for AnythingLLM means that any user with the proper authorization level (manager, admin, and when in single user) could put in the URL ``` http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance ``` which is a special IP and URL that resolves only when the request comes from within an EC2 instance. This would allow the user to see the connection/secret credentials for their specific instance and be able to manage it regardless of who deployed it. The user would have to have pre-existing knowledge of the hosting infra which the target instance is deployed on, but if sent - would resolve if on EC2 and the proper `iptable` or firewall rule is not configured for their setup.

Attacker, with permission to submit a link or submits a link via POST to be collected that is using the file:// protocol can then introspect host files and other relatively stored files.

As a manager, you should not be able to modify a series of settings. In the UI this is indeed hidden as a convenience for the role since most managers would not be savvy enough to modify these settings. They can use their token to still modify those settings though through a standard HTTP request While this is not a critical vulnerability, it does indeed need to be patched to enforce the expected permission level.

Theoretically, it would be possible for an attacker to brute-force the password for an instance in single-user password protection mode via a timing attack given the linear nature of the `!==` used for comparison. The risk is minified by the additional overhead of the request, which varies in a non-constant nature making the attack less reliable to execute

User can send a chat that contains an XSS opportunity that will then run when the chat is sent and on subsequent page loads. Given the minimum requirement for a user to send a chat is to be given access to a workspace via an admin the risk is low. Additionally, the location in which the XSS renders is only limited to the user who submits the XSS. Ultimately, this attack is limited to the user attacking themselves. There is no anonymous chat submission unless the user does not take the minimum steps required to protect their instance.