btcd is an alternative full node bitcoin implementation written in Go (golang). The btcd Bitcoin client (versions 0.10 to 0.24) did not correctly re-implement Bitcoin Core's "FindAndDelete()" functionality. This logic is consensus-critical: the difference in behavior with the other Bitcoin clients can lead to btcd clients accepting an invalid Bitcoin block (or rejecting a valid one). This consensus failure can be leveraged to cause a chain split (accepting an invalid Bitcoin block) or be exploited to DoS the btcd nodes (rejecting a valid Bitcoin block). An attacker can create a standard transaction where FindAndDelete doesn't return a match but removeOpCodeByData does making btcd get a different sighash, leading to a chain split. Importantly, this vulnerability can be exploited remotely by any Bitcoin user and does not require any hash power. This is because the difference in behavior can be triggered by a "standard" Bitcoin transaction, that is a transaction which gets relayed throug…

Extract is aA Go library to extract archives in zip, tar.gz or tar.bz2 formats. A maliciously crafted archive may allow an attacker to create a symlink outside the extraction target directory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.0.0. If you're using the Extractor.FS interface, then upgrading to /v4 will require to implement the new methods that have been added.

Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. An admin user can create a device with a malicious hostname containing php code and repeat the installation process (completing only step 5 of the installation process is enough, no need to complete the steps before or after it) to use a php file as the cacti log file. After having the malicious hostname end up in the logs (log poisoning), one can simply go to the log file url to execute commands to achieve RCE. This issue has been addressed in version 1.2.28 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

A vulnerability was found in Golang FIPS OpenSSL. This flaw allows a malicious user to randomly cause an uninitialized buffer length variable with a zeroed buffer to be returned in FIPS mode. It may also be possible to force a false positive match between non-equal hashes when comparing a trusted computed hmac sum to an untrusted input sum if an attacker can send a zeroed buffer in place of a pre-computed sum.  It is also possible to force a derived key to be all zeros instead of an unpredictable value.  This may have follow-on implications for the Go TLS stack.

A flaw was found in Go. When FIPS mode is enabled on a system, container runtimes may incorrectly handle certain file paths due to improper validation in the containers/common Go library. This flaw allows an attacker to exploit symbolic links and trick the system into mounting sensitive host directories inside a container. This issue also allows attackers to access critical host files, bypassing the intended isolation between containers and the host system.

go-tuf is a Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). The go-tuf client inconsistently traces the delegations. For example, if targets delegate to "A", and to "B", and "B" delegates to "C", then the client should trace the delegations in the order "A" then "B" then "C" but it may incorrectly trace the delegations "B"->"C"->"A". This vulnerability is fixed in 2.0.1.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/client: fix deadlock in show_meminfo() There is a real deadlock as well as sleeping in atomic() bug in here, if the bo put happens to be the last ref, since bo destruction wants to grab the same spinlock and sleeping locks. Fix that by dropping the ref using xe_bo_put_deferred(), and moving the final commit outside of the lock. Dropping the lock around the put is tricky since the bo can go out of scope and delete itself from the list, making it difficult to navigate to the next list entry. (cherry picked from commit 0083b8e6f11d7662283a267d4ce7c966812ffd8a)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/hyperv: fix kexec crash due to VP assist page corruption commit 9636be85cc5b ("x86/hyperv: Fix hyperv_pcpu_input_arg handling when CPUs go online/offline") introduces a new cpuhp state for hyperv initialization. cpuhp_setup_state() returns the state number if state is CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN or CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN and 0 for all other states. For the hyperv case, since a new cpuhp state was introduced it would return 0. However, in hv_machine_shutdown(), the cpuhp_remove_state() call is conditioned upon "hyperv_init_cpuhp > 0". This will never be true and so hv_cpu_die() won't be called on all CPUs. This means the VP assist page won't be reset. When the kexec kernel tries to setup the VP assist page again, the hypervisor corrupts the memory region of the old VP assist page causing a panic in case the kexec kernel is using that memory elsewhere. This was originally fixed in commit dfe94d4086e4 ("x86/hyperv: Fix kexe…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: rockchip: Resolve unbalanced runtime PM / system PM handling Commit e882575efc77 ("spi: rockchip: Suspend and resume the bus during NOIRQ_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM ops") stopped respecting runtime PM status and simply disabled clocks unconditionally when suspending the system. This causes problems when the device is already runtime suspended when we go to sleep -- in which case we double-disable clocks and produce a WARNing. Switch back to pm_runtime_force_{suspend,resume}(), because that still seems like the right thing to do, and the aforementioned commit makes no explanation why it stopped using it. Also, refactor some of the resume() error handling, because it's not actually a good idea to re-disable clocks on failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fix bitmap corruption on close_range() with CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE copy_fd_bitmaps(new, old, count) is expected to copy the first count/BITS_PER_LONG bits from old->full_fds_bits[] and fill the rest with zeroes. What it does is copying enough words (BITS_TO_LONGS(count/BITS_PER_LONG)), then memsets the rest. That works fine, *if* all bits past the cutoff point are clear. Otherwise we are risking garbage from the last word we'd copied. For most of the callers that is true - expand_fdtable() has count equal to old->max_fds, so there's no open descriptors past count, let alone fully occupied words in ->open_fds[], which is what bits in ->full_fds_bits[] correspond to. The other caller (dup_fd()) passes sane_fdtable_size(old_fdt, max_fds), which is the smallest multiple of BITS_PER_LONG that covers all opened descriptors below max_fds. In the common case (copying on fork()) max_fds is ~0U, so all opened descriptors wi…