MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph to all network interfaces, wireless and wired. This is the result of a bad set up and can be mitigated by appropriately configuring ROS and/or applying custom patches as appropriate. Currently, the ROS computational graph can be accessed fully from the wired exposed ports. In combination with other flaws such as CVE-2020-10269, the computation graph can also be fetched and interacted from wireless networks. This allows a malicious operator to take control of the ROS logic and correspondingly, the complete robot given that MiR's operations are centered around the framework (ROS).

MiR100, MiR200 and other MiR robots use the Robot Operating System (ROS) default packages exposing the computational graph without any sort of authentication. This allows attackers with access to the internal wireless and wired networks to take control of the robot seamlessly. In combination with CVE-2020-10269 and CVE-2020-10271, this flaw allows malicious actors to command the robot at desire.

One of the wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and possibly (according to the vendor) other MiR fleet vehicles comes pre-configured in WiFi Master (Access Point) mode. Credentials to such wireless Access Point default to well known and widely spread SSID (MiR_RXXXX) and passwords (omitted). This information is also available in past User Guides and manuals which the vendor distributed. We have confirmed this flaw in MiR100 and MiR200 but it might also apply to MiR250, MiR500 and MiR1000.

The password for the safety PLC is the default and thus easy to find (in manuals, etc.). This allows a manipulated program to be uploaded to the safety PLC, effectively disabling the emergency stop in case an object is too close to the robot. Navigation and any other components dependent on the laser scanner are not affected (thus it is hard to detect before something happens) though the laser scanner configuration can also be affected altering further the safety of the device.

The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived from the publicly available default credentials for the web interface. Given a USERNAME and a PASSWORD, the token string is generated directly with base64(USERNAME:sha256(PASSWORD)). An unauthorized attacker inside the network can use the default credentials to compute the token and interact with the REST API to exfiltrate, infiltrate or delete data.

The BIOS onboard MiR's Computer is not protected by password, therefore, it allows a Bad Operator to modify settings such as boot order. This can be leveraged by a Malicious operator to boot from a Live Image.

MiR controllers across firmware versions 2.8.1.1 and before do not encrypt or protect in any way the intellectual property artifacts installed in the robots. This flaw allows attackers with access to the robot or the robot network (while in combination with other flaws) to retrieve and easily exfiltrate all installed intellectual property and data.

There is no mechanism in place to prevent a bad operator to boot from a live OS image, this can lead to extraction of sensible files (such as the shadow file) or privilege escalation by manually adding a new user with sudo privileges on the machine.

Out of the wired and wireless interfaces within MiR100, MiR200 and other vehicles from the MiR fleet, it's possible to access the Control Dashboard on a hardcoded IP address. Credentials to such wireless interface default to well known and widely spread users (omitted) and passwords (omitted). This information is also available in past User Guides and manuals which the vendor distributed. This flaw allows cyber attackers to take control of the robot remotely and make use of the default user interfaces MiR has created, lowering the complexity of attacks and making them available to entry-level attackers. More elaborated attacks can also be established by clearing authentication and sending network requests directly. We have confirmed this flaw in MiR100 and MiR200 but according to the vendor, it might also apply to MiR250, MiR500 and MiR1000.

There are two denial of service vulnerabilities on some Huawei smartphones. An attacker may send specially crafted TD-SCDMA messages from a rogue base station to the affected devices. Due to insufficient input validation of two values when parsing the messages, successful exploit may cause device abnormal. This is 1 out of 2 vulnerabilities. Different than CVE-2020-5303. Affected products are: ALP-AL00B: earlier than 9.1.0.333(C00E333R2P1T8) ALP-L09: earlier than 9.1.0.300(C432E4R1P9T8) ALP-L29: earlier than 9.1.0.315(C636E5R1P13T8) BLA-L29C: earlier than 9.1.0.321(C636E4R1P14T8), earlier than 9.1.0.330(C432E6R1P12T8), earlier than 9.1.0.302(C635E4R1P13T8) Berkeley-AL20: earlier than 9.1.0.333(C00E333R2P1T8) Berkeley-L09: earlier than 9.1.0.350(C10E3R1P14T8), earlier than 9.1.0.351(C432E5R1P13T8), earlier than 9.1.0.350(C636E4R1P13T8) Charlotte-L09C: earlier than 9.1.0.311(C185E4R1P11T8), earlier than 9.1.0.345(C432E8R1P11T8) Charlotte-L29C: earlier than 9.1.0.325(C185E4R1P11T8), earl…