An improper restriction of external entities (XXE) vulnerability in dompdf/dompdf's SVG parser allows for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and deserialization attacks. This issue affects all versions prior to 2.0.0. The vulnerability can be exploited even if the isRemoteEnabled option is set to false. It allows attackers to perform SSRF, disclose internal image files, and cause PHAR deserialization attacks.

DomPDF before version 2.0.0 is vulnerable to PHAR deserialization due to a lack of checking on the protocol before passing it into the file_get_contents() function. An attacker who can upload files of any type to the server can pass in the phar:// protocol to unserialize the uploaded file and instantiate arbitrary PHP objects. This can lead to remote code execution, especially when DOMPdf is used with frameworks with documented POP chains like Laravel or vulnerable developer code.

php-svg-lib is a scalable vector graphics (SVG) file parsing/rendering library. Prior to version 0.5.2, php-svg-lib fails to validate that font-family doesn't contain a PHAR url, which might leads to RCE on PHP < 8.0, and doesn't validate if external references are allowed. This might leads to bypass of restrictions or RCE on projects that are using it, if they do not strictly revalidate the fontName that is passed by php-svg-lib. The `Style::fromAttributes(`), or the `Style::parseCssStyle()` should check the content of the `font-family` and prevents it to use a PHAR url, to avoid passing an invalid and dangerous `fontName` value to other libraries. The same check as done in the `Style::fromStyleSheets` might be reused. Libraries using this library as a dependency might be vulnerable to some bypass of restrictions, or even remote code execution, if they do not double check the value of the `fontName` that is passed by php-svg-lib. Version 0.5.2 contains a fix for this issue.

Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. When parsing SVG images Dompdf performs an initial validation to ensure that paths within the SVG are allowed. One of the validations is that the SVG document does not reference itself. However, prior to version 2.0.4, a recursive chained using two or more SVG documents is not correctly validated. Depending on the system configuration and attack pattern this could exhaust the memory available to the executing process and/or to the server itself. php-svg-lib, when run in isolation, does not support SVG references for `image` elements. However, when used in combination with Dompdf, php-svg-lib will process SVG images referenced by an `image` element. Dompdf currently includes validation to prevent self-referential `image` references, but a chained reference is not checked. A malicious actor may thus trigger infinite recursion by chaining references between two or more SVG images. When Dompdf parses a malicious payload, it will crash due afte…

php-svg-lib is an SVG file parsing / rendering library. Prior to version 0.5.1, when handling `<use>` tag that references an `<image>` tag, it merges the attributes from the `<use>` tag to the `<image>` tag. The problem pops up especially when the `href` attribute from the `<use>` tag has not been sanitized. This can lead to an unsafe file read that can cause PHAR Deserialization vulnerability in PHP prior to version 8. Version 0.5.1 contains a patch for this issue.

php-svg-lib is an SVG file parsing / rendering library. Prior to version 0.5.1, when parsing the attributes passed to a `use` tag inside an svg document, an attacker can cause the system to go to an infinite recursion. Depending on the system configuration and attack pattern this could exhaust the memory available to the executing process and/or to the server itself. An attacker sending multiple request to a system to render the above payload can potentially cause resource exhaustion to the point that the system is unable to handle incoming request. Version 0.5.1 contains a patch for this issue.

Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter written in php. Due to the difference in the attribute parser of Dompdf and php-svg-lib, an attacker can still call arbitrary URLs with arbitrary protocols. Dompdf parses the href attribute of `image` tags and respects `xlink:href` even if `href` is specified. However, php-svg-lib, which is later used to parse the svg file, parses the href attribute. Since `href` is respected if both `xlink:href` and `href` is specified, it's possible to bypass the protection on the Dompdf side by providing an empty `xlink:href` attribute. An attacker can exploit the vulnerability to call arbitrary URLs with arbitrary protocols if they provide an SVG file to the Dompdf. In PHP versions before 8.0.0, it leads to arbitrary unserialize, which will lead, at the very least, to arbitrary file deletion and might lead to remote code execution, depending on available classes. This vulnerability has been addressed in commit `95009ea98` which has been included in release versio…

Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter. The URI validation on dompdf 2.0.1 can be bypassed on SVG parsing by passing `<image>` tags with uppercase letters. This may lead to arbitrary object unserialize on PHP < 8, through the `phar` URL wrapper. An attacker can exploit the vulnerability to call arbitrary URL with arbitrary protocols, if they can provide a SVG file to dompdf. In PHP versions before 8.0.0, it leads to arbitrary unserialize, that will lead to the very least to an arbitrary file deletion and even remote code execution, depending on classes that are available.

registerFont in FontMetrics.php in Dompdf before 2.0.1 allows remote file inclusion because a URI validation failure does not halt font registration, as demonstrated by a @font-face rule.

External Control of File Name or Path in GitHub repository dompdf/dompdf prior to 2.0.0.