In the goTenna Pro App there is a vulnerability that makes it possible to inject any custom message with any GID and Callsign using a software defined radio in existing goTenna mesh networks. This vulnerability can be exploited if the device is being used in an unencrypted environment or if the cryptography has already been compromised. It is advised to share encryption keys via QR scanning for higher security operations and update your app to the current release for enhanced encryption protocols.

The goTenna Pro App does not use SecureRandom when generating passwords for sharing cryptographic keys. The random function in use makes it easier for attackers to brute force this password if the broadcasted encryption key is captured over RF. This only applies to the optional broadcast of an encryption key, so it is advised to share the key with local QR code for higher security operations.

The goTenna Pro App does not authenticate public keys which allows an unauthenticated attacker to manipulate messages. It is advised to update your app to the current release for enhanced encryption protocols.

The goTenna Pro App does not encrypt callsigns in messages. It is recommended to not use sensitive information in callsigns when using this and previous versions of the app and update your app to the current app version which uses AES-256 encryption for callsigns in encrypted operation.

The goTenna Pro App uses AES CTR type encryption for short, encrypted messages without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to an attacker that can access the message. It is recommended to continue to use encryption in the app and update to the current release for more secure operations.

In the goTenna Pro App, the encryption keys are stored along with a static IV on the End User Device (EUD). This allows for complete decryption of keys stored on the EUD if physically compromised. This allows an attacker to decrypt all encrypted broadcast communications based on encryption keys stored on the EUD. This requires access to and control of the EUD, so it is recommended to use strong access control measures and layered encryption on the EUD for more secure operation.

The goTenna Pro App uses a weak password for sharing encryption keys via the key broadcast method. If the broadcasted encryption key is captured over RF, and password is cracked via brute force attack, it is possible to decrypt it and use it to decrypt all future and past messages sent via encrypted broadcast with that particular key. This only applies when the key is broadcasted over RF. This is an optional feature, so it is recommended to use local QR encryption key sharing for additional security on this and previous versions.

The goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin does not encrypt callsigns in messages. It is advised to not use sensitive information in callsigns when using this and previous versions of the plugin. Update to current plugin version which uses AES-256 encryption for callsigns in encrypted operation

The goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin does not use SecureRandom when generating passwords for sharing cryptographic keys. The random function in use makes it easier for attackers to brute force this password if the broadcasted encryption key is captured over RF. This only applies to the optional broadcast of an encryption key, so it is advised to share the key with local QR code for higher security operations.

The goTenna Pro ATAK plugin uses a weak password for sharing encryption keys via the key broadcast method. If the broadcasted encryption key is captured over RF, and password is cracked via brute force attack, it is possible to decrypt it and use it to decrypt all future and past messages sent via encrypted broadcast with that particular key. This only applies when the key is broadcasted over RF. This is an optional feature, so it is advised to use local QR encryption key sharing for additional security on this and previous versions.