Agnai is an artificial-intelligence-agnostic multi-user, mult-bot roleplaying chat system. A vulnerability in versions prior to 1.0.330 permits attackers to upload arbitrary files to attacker-chosen locations on the server, including JavaScript, enabling the execution of commands within those files. This issue could result in unauthorized access, full server compromise, data leakage, and other critical security threats. This does not affect `agnai.chat`, installations using S3-compatible storage, or self-hosting that is not publicly exposed. This does affect publicly hosted installs without S3-compatible storage. Version 1.0.330 fixes this vulnerability.

The goTenna Pro series allows unauthenticated attackers to remotely update the local public keys used for P2P and Group messages.

The goTenna Pro has a payload length vulnerability that makes it possible to tell the length of the payload regardless of the encryption used.

The goTenna Pro broadcast key name is always sent unencrypted and could reveal the location of operation.

In the goTenna Pro there is a vulnerability that makes it possible to inject any custom message with any GID and Callsign using a software defined radio in existing gotenna mesh networks. This vulnerability can be exploited if the device is being used in a unencrypted environment or if the cryptography has already been compromised.

The goTenna Pro series does not use SecureRandom when generating its cryptographic keys. The random function in use is not suitable for cryptographic use.

The goTenna Pro series does not authenticate public keys which allows an unauthenticated attacker to intercept and manipulate messages.

The goTenna pro series does not encrypt the callsigns of its users. These callsigns reveal information about the users and can also be leveraged for other vulnerabilities.

The goTenna Pro series use AES CTR mode for short, encrypted messages without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to any attacker that can access the message.

In the goTenna Pro application, the encryption keys are stored along with a static IV on the device. This allows for complete decryption of keys stored on the device. This allows an attacker to decrypt all encrypted communications that include P2P, Group, and broadcast messages that use these keys.