Attacker Value
Low
(1 user assessed)
Exploitability
Unknown
(1 user assessed)
User Interaction
Unknown
Privileges Required
Unknown
Attack Vector
Unknown
0

Inferring and hijacking VPN-tunneled TCP connections

Last updated February 13, 2020
Add MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques that apply to this CVE.

Description

We have discovered a vulnerability in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, MacOS, iOS, and Android which allows a malicious access point, or an adjacent user, to determine if a connected user is using a VPN, make positive inferences about the websites they are visiting, and
determine the correct sequence and acknowledgement numbers in use, allowing the bad actor to inject data into the TCP stream. This provides everything that is needed for an attacker to hijack active connections inside the VPN tunnel.

This vulnerability works against OpenVPN, WireGuard, and IKEv2/IPSec, but has not been thoroughly tested against tor, but we believe it is not vulnerable since it operates in a SOCKS layer and includes authentication and encryption that happens in userspace. It should be noted, however, that the VPN technology used does not seem to matter and we are able to make all of our inferences even though the responses from the victim are encrypted, using the size of the packets and number of packets sent (in the case of challenge ACKs, for example) to determine what kind of packets are being sent through the encrypted VPN tunnel.

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3
Ratings
  • Attacker Value
    Low
Technical Analysis

The discussion here https://lwn.net/Articles/806546/ shows some of the problems fixing this generally, which really means disabling the weak host model as a mitigation. This is likely perfectly fine for single-ended hosts, which are likely the most vulnerable targets in the first place.

General Information

Additional Info

Technical Analysis